Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The parties in this case - a board of education and an education association - proceeded to arbitration on a dispute. The parties proceeded on a three member arbitration panel. When a journalist with a newspaper sought to cover the arbitration proceedings, the panel adjourned to what it designated an executive session, closed to the public. The journalist and newspaper (together, Defendants) filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission, claiming that the panel violated the open meetings provision of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Commission ordered the members of the arbitration panel and the Department to create a transcript of the hearing and provide that transcript to Defendants, concluding that the arbitration panel was a committee of the Department of Education and that the evidentiary portion of the arbitration proceeding under the Teacher Negotiation Act (TNA) was subject to the open meetings provision of the FOIA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because a TNA arbitration panel is not a “committee of” the Department, it does not constitute a “public agency.” View "Gould v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Public Service Company of Colorado entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local #111, a union that represented some of the Company’s employees. About two years later, the Company unilaterally modified its retired workers’ healthcare benefits by increasing their copayment obligations for prescription drugs. The Union claimed that the Company had violated the collective-bargaining agreement by doing so and demanded arbitration. The Company refused to arbitrate, and the Union sued and asked the district court to stay the case and compel arbitration. When the district court denied that motion, the Union filed an interlocutory appeal. The issues this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review were: (1) whether the Tenth Circuit ha jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (2) whether the district court should have sent the case to arbitration. The Court concluded that appellate jurisdiction existed under the Federal Arbitration Act, and that the district court properly denied compelling arbitration because the collective-bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision was not susceptible to an interpretation that covers disputes over retired workers’ healthcare benefits. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "IBEW Local #111 v. Public Service Co." on Justia Law

When Khazin began working for TD, he signed an employment agreement and agreed to arbitrate all disputes. Khazin was responsible for due diligence on financial products offered by TD . When he discovered that one product was priced in a manner noncompliant with securities regulations, he reported to his supervisor, Demmissie, and recommended changing the price. Demmissie instructed Khazin to analyze the “revenue impact,” which revealed that remedying the violation would save customers $2,000,000, but would cost TD $1,150,000 and negatively impact Demmissie’s divisions. Demmissie allegedly told Khazin not to correct the problem. Demmissie and TD’s human resources department later confronted Khazin about a purported billing irregularity that, he claims, was unrelated to his duties and nonexistent. His employment was terminated. Khazin sued, asserting violation of the Dodd-Frank Act, premised on the allegation that he had been terminated in retaliation for “whistleblowing.” Khazin contended that the Act prevented TD from compelling the arbitration of his whistleblower retaliation claim, 18 U.S.C. 1514A(e)(2). The district court held that the provision did not prohibit enforcement of arbitration agreements executed before Dodd-Frank was passed. The Third Circuit concluded that Khazin’s whistleblower claim is subject to arbitration because it is not covered by the restrictions. View "Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp" on Justia Law

The McTaggarts filed suit against the former trustee and trust advisor of their family trust, alleging improper handling of their trust funds. The former trustee and trust advisor moved to dismiss the case or have the case stayed pending arbitration, based on an arbitration provision in a wealth-management agreement between the former trustee and trust advisor. The trial court found that, because the McTaggarts did not sign the agreement containing the arbitration provision and because the agreement specifically excluded nonsignatories, including third-party beneficiaries, the arbitration provision was not binding on the McTaggarts. The former trustee and trust advisor appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pinnacle Trust Company, L.L.C., EFP Advisors, Inc. v. McTaggart" on Justia Law

Petitioner Safari Associates and real party in interest Alan Tarlov arbitrated a dispute pursuant to a written agreement. The arbitrator awarded Safari damages, attorney fees, and costs. Safari petitioned to confirm the arbitration award at the trial court. In response, Tarlov filed a motion to modify or correct the award on the ground that the arbitrator acted in excess of his powers in awarding Safari attorney fees. The trial court ruled that the arbitrator's decision to apply Civil Section section 1717 was subject to judicial review, and concluded that the arbitrator had erred in failing to apply the definition of "prevailing party" contained in the parties' agreement. The trial court corrected the award by ruling that the definition of prevailing party contained in the parties' agreement applied and remanding the matter to the arbitrator for further proceedings to apply the agreement's definition of prevailing party in determining whether to award attorney fees. Safari filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting that the Court of Appeal direct the trial court to vacate its order correcting the arbitrator's award. The Court found that the record unambiguously demonstrated that Safari and Tarlov extensively briefed this very issue in the arbitration. In addition, there was no provision in the parties' arbitration agreement that "explicitly and unambiguously limited" the arbitrator's power to determine the applicability of section 1717 in awarding attorney fees. Under these circumstances, the arbitrator acted within the scope of his powers in applying the definition of prevailing party found in section 1717, subdivision (b)(1) in awarding Safari attorney fees. Further, any error that the arbitrator may have committed would have constituted legal error, which was not subject to correction in the trial court. Accordingly, the Court granted Safari's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order correcting the arbitration award, and to conduct further proceedings. View "Safari Associates v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Russ Irwin brought an arbitration proceeding against Lyman Morse Boatbuilding, Inc. (LMB) of Maine and Cabot Lyman, the controlling owner of LMB, claiming damages related to the allegedly defective construction of a luxury yacht. After Northern Assurance Company of America, the insurer for LMB and Lyman, refused the insureds’ request for defense, LMB and Lyman filed this federal suit seeking to recover the costs and attorneys’ fees they incurred in the arbitration proceeding. The district court concluded that Northern Assurance had a duty to defend Lyman but did not have a duty to defend LMB. The First Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Northern Assurance, holding that, under Maine law, the insurer did not owe a duty to defend LMB or Lyman in the underlying arbitration proceeding. View "Lyman Morse Boatbuilding Inc. v. N. Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an asset purchase agreement (the Agreement) that contained a provision requiring submission of all disputes concerning the “validity, interpretation and enforcement” of the Agreement to an arbitrator for binding resolution. Plaintiff sued Defendant in federal district court, asserting claims for fraud and breach of contract arising out of the Agreement. Defendant answered the complaint, and the parties began discovery. Several months later, Plaintiff moved to stay proceedings pending arbitration. A magistrate judge denied the motion to stay on the ground that Plaintiff had waived its arbitral rights. The district judge summarily affirmed the denial of the stay. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Plaintiff, through its conduct, waived its right to demand arbitration. View "Joca-Roca Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan, Jr." on Justia Law

The Riverside County Sheriff’s Department fired Deputy Kristy Drinkwater for falsifying her payroll forms. On administrative appeal, Drinkwater sought discovery of redacted records from personnel investigations of eleven other Department employees who were disciplined, but not fired, for similar acts of misconduct. The administrative hearing officer granted the motion. The Department sought a writ of administrative mandate, arguing that only judicial officers could grant Pitchess motions, which are discovery motions for officer personnel records. The superior court agreed and granted mandate. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when hearing an administrative appeal from discipline imposed on a correction officer, an arbitrator may rule upon a Pitchess motion. View "Riverside County Sheriff's Dep’t v. Stiglitz" on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court consolidated cases that arose out of an action brought by Guy Willis against three defendants: Alaska Bush Adventures, LLC ("Alaska Bush") and Hugh and Ryan Krank (collectively, the defendants). The Kranks are the owners and operators of Alaska Bush, an outfitter that provided guided hunting trips in Alaska. In December 2011, Willis entered into a written contract with Alaska Bush pursuant to which Alaska Bush would lead a guided hunting trip in Alaska. Willis also claimed that he entered into a separate oral contract to hunt black bears during that guided hunting trip. The guided hunting trip took place in September 2012. A few months after the trip, Willis sued the defendants in Alabama seeking damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and suppression. Willis's claims against defendants centered primarily on his allegations that the equipment Alaska Bush provided for the hunting expedition was inadequate in number, unsafe, and inoperable, and he also alleged that he lost hunting time because the defendants were providing services to other hunters who were apparently not included in the guided hunting trip. Willis claimed that he lost most of his personal hunting equipment and had to leave the trip early because he "was caused to be thrown from an improperly repaired, inspected, and/or working motorized boat ...." Willis further alleged that the defendants misrepresented the quantity of wild game that would be available on the hunt. Willis filed an application for the entry of a default judgment against Ryan, and, on the following day, he filed a similar application against Alaska Bush and Hugh. On December 21, 2012, defendants filed an answer to Willis's complaint and an objection to Willis's applications for entry of a default judgment. Thereafter, defendants filed a motion to compel Willis to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement found in the written contract. Defendants then each filed an individual motion to dismiss Willis's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court issued an order denying the defendants' respective motions to dismiss and their motion to compel arbitration. In case no. 1130184, defendants petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to challenge the denial of their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; in case no. 1130231, they appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court concluded after review that defendants were not entitled to mandamus relief on the jurisdiction question, but met their burden in their motion to compel arbitration. View "Willis v. Alaska Bush Adventures, LLC et al." on Justia Law

An employer that withdraws from an underfunded pension plan must cover its share of the shortfall, 29 U.S.C. 1381, 1391. After concluding that Allega had withdrawn, the Central States Pension Fund sent it a bill for about $375,000. The employer has 90 days to ask a pension plan to review its decision.. If the plan adheres to the original decision or does not act within 120 days, the employer has another 60 days to seek arbitration. For Allega, the last day was July 16, 2013. On July 9 Allega sent the Fund a letter demanding arbitration. It followed up on July 29 with a notice to the American Arbitration Association.: The AAA’s rules require that notices go to both the pension administrator and the AAA. The Fund has adopted those rules, but Allega did not notify the AAA within the statutory time limit. The district court concluded that Allega had waited too long to seek arbitration and must pay withdrawal liability as the Fund calculated it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Fund’s failure to act within 120 days on a request for reconsideration tolled the time to seek arbitration. View "Cent. States, SE & SW Areas Pension Fund v. Allega Concrete Corp." on Justia Law