Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Bunker Hill petitioned to compel arbitration with its tenant, U.S. Bank, to resolve the parties' disagreement over whether subleases automatically terminate if the underlying lease between the parties terminates. For purposes of Code of Civil Procedure, section 1281.2, the statute that expressly governs petitions to compel arbitration, all a petitioner is required to show before arbitration "shall" be ordered is the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate the issue underlying the petition and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate the controversy. The trial court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the petition to compel arbitration where Bunker Hill made those showings here and there is no indication that any of the three narrow exceptions apply. Accordingly, the court denied the petition and reversed with directions for the trial court to grant the petition. View "Bunker Hill Park v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an architectural firm, signed an agreement with the Rhode Island Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide architectural and engineering services for renovations at a state-owned property. A Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) referencing the agreement stated that the compensation was not to exceed a certain amount. When Plaintiff requested additional compensation without success, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the superior court seeking relief. The matter was held in abeyance while a statutory arbitration procedure was underway. The arbitrator concluded that, while Plaintiff rendered additional services to DHS, the additional work was not authorized under the BPA, and therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to additional compensation. Plaintiff then filed a petition to compel arbitration in the superior court against DHS. The trial justice denied relief, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred Plaintiff’s claims. View "Torrado Architects v. R.I. Dep’t of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Matthew Tubaugh, a police officer with the City of Livingston, was discharged from the police force after a series of incidents. Tubaugh protested his discharge pursuant to his rights under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) then in effect between the City and the Montana Public Employees Association. An arbitrator determined that there was just cause to discipline Tubaugh but that the proper disciplinary action was a three-month suspension without pay. The district court vacated the arbitrator’s award. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to confirm the arbitration award, holding that the district court (1) incorrectly determined that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in her interpretation of the CBA; (2) erred in holding that the arbitrator violated public policy by requiring the City to reinstate Tubaugh to his previous position or to one of comparable pay; (3) erred by determining that the arbitrator’s award should be vacated because of its findings related to a fitness for duty examination; and (4) erred by holding that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by directing removal of the fitness for duty examination from Tubaugh’s personnel file. View "Livingston v. Mont. Pub. Employees Ass’n" on Justia Law

The trial judge denied the appellants' motion to compel arbitration on the ground that there was no binding arbitration agreement. The trial judge ruled that Tamera Nelson did not have authority to sign an arbitration agreement on behalf of her grandmother, Arda Lee Churchill (who was a resident of the Grace Living Center-Chikasha until her death), so no valid arbitration agreement existed. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that no valid arbitration agreement existed because Tamera Nelson was not authorized to make health care decisions for her grandmother under the circumstances. The Health Care Power of Attorney required that Arda Lee Churchill's physician certify that she was not capable of making her own health care decisions and no such certification was made. View "Johnson v. Convalescent Center of Grady, LLC" on Justia Law

This suit arose out of an insurance policy SWEPCO, a public electric utility serving Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, purchased from Underwriters for coverage associated with the construction of a power plant in Louisiana. On appeal, SWEPCO challenged the district court's order granting Underwriters' motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that the district court's order was not a final, appealable order within the meaning of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 201-08, or the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-16. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Southwestern Elec. Power Co., et al. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London" on Justia Law

Real party in interest Alicia Moreno sued her former employer petitioner Garden Fresh Restaurant Corporation for claims related to a variety of alleged Labor Code violations. Moreno filed the action as a putative class action, and also pursued representative relief under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Garden Fresh moved to compel arbitration of Moreno's claims, on an individual basis only, based on two arbitration agreements that Moreno signed during her tenure as an employee of Garden Fresh. Garden Fresh requested that the court dismiss Moreno's class and representative claims, arguing that the parties' arbitration agreements did not contemplate class- or representative-based arbitration. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, but specifically left to the arbitrator to decide the question whether the arbitration agreements between the parties contemplated classwide and/or representative arbitration, thereby denying Garden Fresh's request that only Moreno's individual claims be sent to arbitration. Garden Fresh filed a petition for a writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, presenting one issue: who decides whether an agreement to arbitrate disputes between the parties to the agreement authorizes class and/or representative arbitration when the contract is silent on the matter - the arbitrator or the court? The Court concluded that the question whether an arbitration agreement permits class and/or representative arbitration was a gateway issue, and thus reserved " 'for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.' " The Court granted the request for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court: (1) to vacate that portion of its order leaving it to the arbitrator to determine whether the parties agreed to class and/or representative arbitration; (2) to conduct further proceedings as necessary to determine whether the parties' arbitration agreement contemplates class and/or representative arbitration, and whether the plaintiff's representative PAGA claims may be arbitrated, or rather, whether that claim should be bifurcated; and (3) to enter a new order setting forth the court's determination as to these issues. View "Garden Fresh Restaurant Corp. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit against defendant alleging Labor Code violations. Defendant filed a petition to compel arbitration and dismiss the class claims. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's order denying its petition to compel arbitration and strike class claims. Plaintiff cross-appealed an order denying her Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 sanctions motion. The court concluded that J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB does not permit the court to refuse to enforce the arbitration clause in the individual agreement which is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2. The court agreed with defendant that plaintiff is required to arbitrate her statutory claims under an individual arbitration agreement where the arbitration agreement is enforceable because it is consistent with the collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying defendant's petition to compel arbitration. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's sanctions motion. Upon remittitur issuance, the trial court is to compel arbitration and stay the action until completion of arbitration. View "Willis v. Prime Healthcare Services" on Justia Law

Regions Bank appealed a trial court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration in its dispute with Jerry Neighbors. Neighbors obtained a home loan from Regions in 1999. As part of the loan application, Neighbors executed a dispute-resolution agreement (DRA). In 2008, Neighbors modified the loan. Neighbors denied he signed the loan-modification agreement; he claimed that his signature on that document was forged. The loan-modification agreement also contained an arbitration provision. In 2013, Neighbors sued Regions, alleging that Regions had negligently and wantonly allowed an imposter to forge Neighbors's signature on the loan-modification agreement. Relying on the DRA, Regions moved to compel the arbitration of Neighbors's claims. Neighbors opposed the motion to compel, arguing that because the dispute in this case involved an alleged forgery, the dispute could not be subject to the provisions of the DRA. Neighbors also suggested that the DRA did not cover his claims because, pursuant to the terms of the judgment divorcing him and his wife, he stopped making payments on the original mortgage in 2006 when his ex-wife remarried. Although Neighbors characterized the dispute otherwise, the Supreme Court concluded that the dispute in this case concerned the scope of the DRA. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Regions Bank v. Neighbors" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against Sirius XM after he received three unauthorized phone calls from Sirius XM on his cellphone during his trial subscription. Plaintiff had purchased a vehicle from Toyota that included a 90-day trial subscription to Sirius XM satellite radio. The district court dismissed the action and granted Sirius XM's motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 2. The court, applying well-settled principles of contract law, concluded that no valid agreement to arbitrate exists between plaintiff and Sirius XM because plaintiff never assented to the Customer Agreement. A reasonable person in plaintiff's position could not be expected to understand that purchasing a vehicle from Toyota would simultaneously bind him or her to any contract to Sirius XM, let alone one that contained an arbitration provision without any notice of such terms. Nothing in the record indicated that Sirius XM's offer was clearly and effectively communicated to plaintiff by mailing him the Customer Agreement and his continued use of the service after his receipt of the Customer Agreement did not manifest his assent to the provisions of the Customer Agreement. Further, the Customer Agreement is not a valid "shrinkwrap" agreement. Because the arbitration clause in the Customer Agreement is unenforceable for lack of mutual assent, the court need not decide whether the arbitration provision in the Customer Agreement is unconscionable. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio" on Justia Law

Pine Top, an insurer, sued Banco, an entity wholly owned by Uruguay, claiming that Banco owes $2,352,464.08 under reinsurance contracts. The complaint sought to compel arbitration but alternately proposed that the court enter judgment for breach of contract. Pine Top moved to strike Banco’s answer for failure to post security under Illinois insurance law. The district court denied the motion and later denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which prohibits attaching a foreign state’s property, thereby preventing application of the Illinois security requirement, 28 U.S.C. 1609. Banco did not waive its immunity in the manner allowed by that law and Pine Top forfeited contentions that the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows a state rule to govern. On the arbitration question, the court held that denials of motions to compel arbitration under the Panama Convention are immediately appealable under 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(1)(B), but that the contract language, reasonably read, does not transfer the right to demand arbitration. View "Pine Top Receivables of IL, LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado" on Justia Law