Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

This dispute arose from a contract signed by the parties in 2006, the Wireless Patent License Agreement, which provided for arbitration as the mechanism to resolve any claims arising under that Agreement. LG Electronics, Inc. sought a declaration in the Court of Chancery that InterDigital Communications, Inc., InterDigital Technology Corporation, and IPR Licensing Inc. that InterDigital had breached a nondisclosure agreement between the parties by disclosing confidential information during a pending arbitration proceeding. The Court of Chancery granted InterDigital's motion to dismiss, holding that all of LG's claims were properly before the arbitral tribunal, and deferred to the "first-filed proceeding" based on the factors established by the Delaware Supreme Court in "McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Engineering Co." After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the McWane doctrine applied in this case, and that it supported dismissing LG's claims. View "LG Electronics, Inc. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

A franchisee janitorial worker, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals, filed a complaint against System4 LLC, a master franchisor, and NECCS, Inc., a regional subfranchisor, alleging, among other claims, breach of contract, misclassification as independent contractors in their franchise agreements, and rescission of the franchise agreements. The franchise agreements, signed only by Plaintiffs and NEECS, required the franchisees to arbitrate virtually all disputes. Defendants, citing the arbitration clause in the franchise agreement, moved to stay the court proceedings pending arbitration. The judge concluded that because System4 was not a nonsignatory to the agreements, Plaintiffs could proceed to litigate their claims against System4 in court. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that, by reason of equitable estoppel, System4 could compel Plaintiffs to arbitrate their substantive claims in accordance with the arbitration provision in Plaintiffs’ franchise agreements. Remanded. View "Machado v. System4 LLC" on Justia Law

3850 & 3860 Colonial Blvd. LLC acquired an interest in Rubicon Media, LLC, a limited liability company controlled by Christopher Griffin. Griffin carried out a recapitalization of Rubicon LLC, which gave rise to Colonial’s principal claims. Rubicon LLC’s operating agreement required arbitration. Griffin later converted Rubicon LLC into Rubicon Media, Inc. At issue in this case was whether Colonial was obligated to arbitrate or whether creation of Rubicon Media as the LLC’s successor - with a charter providing exclusively for litigation - eliminated any right or duty to arbitrate. In a letter opinion, the Court of Chancery stayed proceedings pending arbitration, specifically awaiting resolution of the question of substantive arbitrability. Colonial sought certification of an interlocutory appeal of that order. The Court rejected Colonial’s application for certification of an interlocutory appeal, holding that there was an arguable basis for arbitration that raised a question for resolution in the arbitration forum. View "3850 & 3860 Colonial Blvd., LLC v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Shasta Linen Supply, a California corporation, applied for workers’ compensation insurance coverage from Applied Underwriters, a Nebraska corporation. Shasta accepted Applied’s proposed policy through an agreement entitled a Request to Bind Coverages & Services. On the same day, Shasta entered into a Reinsurance Participation Agreement (RPA) with Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company (AUCRA), Applied’s subsidiary and a British Virgin Islands corporation. The request to bind and the RPA contained conflicting provisions regarding the parties’ arbitration process for resolving disputes. After a dispute arose regarding the amount of money that Shasta owed to Applied, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) acknowledged receipt of AUCRA’s demand for arbitration. Shasta filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the request to bind required arbitration by "JAMS" in Omaha, Nebraska and injunctive relief from the AAA arbitration. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to decide which contract provision controlled and issued a temporary injunction and stay of the AAA arbitration until it decided the parties’ rights. Applied and AUCRA appealed, arguing that the court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the parties’ contract dispute and granting a temporary injunction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the court’s temporary injunction and stay was an interlocutory order that was not appealable. View "Shasta Linen Supply, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc." on Justia Law

This arbitration case stemmed from disputes over Appellee Organizational Strategies, Inc.'s (OSI) captive insurance program, created with Appellants Capstone Insurance Management, Ltd., Capstone Associated Services, and Capstone Associated Services (Wyoming), LP's (collectively, "Capstone") assistance. Appellant PoolRe, managed by Capstone, provided insurance services to OSI's newly created captive insurance companies. Capstone and OSI entered into contracts requiring AAA arbitration, whereas PoolRe and the captive insurance companies entered into contracts requiring ICC arbitration. An arbitrator joined all of the parties for arbitration under AAA rules. Because the arbitrator acted contrary to the express provisions of the PoolRe arbitration agreements, the district court held that arbitrator exceeded his authority and, pursuant to 9 U.S.C. 10, vacated the award. Finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "PoolRe Insurance Corp. v. Organizational Strategies, Inc." on Justia Law

Elisa Zapata died while under the care of the Fredericksburg Care Company, LP, a nursing home. Zapata’s death and survival beneficiaries sued Fredericksburg, alleging negligent care and wrongful death. Fredericksburg filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in an agreement that Zapata signed prior to her admission in the nursing home. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, concluding (1) the pre-admission agreement’s arbitration clause did not comply with Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 74.451 and was therefore invalid; and (2) the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) applied in this case, thus triggering the exemption under which the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would not preempt the state statute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the MFA does not exempt section 74.451 from preemption by the FAA, and the trial court should have granted Fredericksburg’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Fredericksburg Care Co., LP v. Perez" on Justia Law

Municipal Workers Compensation Fund, Inc. ("the Fund"), appealed a circuit court's order denying the Fund's motion to vacate a judgment entered on an arbitration award. The Fund entrusted the management and investment of approximately $50 million in assets to Morgan Asset Management, Inc. ("MAM"), and Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. ("Morgan Keegan"). MAM served as an investment advisor for a managed account and certain mutual funds owned by the Fund. Morgan Keegan served as the broker-dealer for the Fund's managed account and had the authority as the broker-dealer to execute transactions in that account as directed by the Fund. A second account at Morgan Keegan held the mutual funds that had been sold to the Fund through a Morgan Keegan broker. The Fund stated that it directed MAM and Morgan Keegan to invest its funds conservatively and that it relied on MAM and Morgan Keegan for sound financial advice and management. However, according to the Fund, MAM and Morgan Keegan disregarded this mandate by recommending that the Fund purchase and hold what the Fund says were unsuitable investments, by overconcentrating the Fund's assets in investments that had undue exposure to the sub-prime mortgage market and in other risky investments, and by misrepresenting and failing to disclose material facts pertaining to the investments. The Fund claims that it sustained losses in excess of $15 million in 2007 and 2008 as a result of the actions of MAM and Morgan Keegan. The Fund initiated arbitration proceedings against MAM and Morgan Keegan by filing a statement of claim with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in its contracts with MAM and Morgan Keegan, asserting claims of breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract; negligence; fraud; violations of NASD and NYSE Rules; and violations of the Alabama Securities Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded from the admissible evidence entered at trial, the Fund established an evident partiality on the part of one of the arbitrators, and that the Fund was entitled to have the judgment entered on the arbitration award vacated. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Municipal Workers Compensation Fund, Inc. v. Morgan Keegan & Co." on Justia Law

Law firms Campbell Harrison & Dagley, L.L.P. (CHD), and Calloway, Norris, Burdette & Weber, P.L.L.C. (CNBW) (collectively, the firms), challenged the district court’s partial vacatur of most of an arbitration award, rendered pursuant to a fee agreement (combining a high hourly-rate fee and a low-percentage contingency fee), which governed the firms’ representation of Albert G. Hill, III, and his wife, Erin Hill. After arbitrating a dispute over the requested payment to the firms under the fee agreement, the arbitrators awarded them approximately $28 million. Although the district court, inter alia, enforced the hourly-rate fee award, it vacated the contingency-fee award as unconscionable. In rejecting the arbitrators’ determinations regarding the uncertainty of recovery, the reasonableness of the total fee, and unconscionability, the Fifth Circuit concluded the district court “substitute[d] [its] judgment for that of the arbitrators merely because [it] would have reached a different decision”. As a result, it erred in vacating the contingency-fee-portion of the award and related awards (for the arbitration, the firms’ attorney’s fees, other fees, expenses, and arbitrators’ compensation; and pre-judgment interest on the contingency-fee portion). The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court with respect to the unconscionability issue, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The district court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Campbell Harrison & Dagley, et al v. Hill" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of Daymar College students, filed a lawsuit against Daymar, challenging the college’s admissions process as both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the incorporation of an arbitration provision on the reverse side of the Student Enrollment Agreement, claiming they were unaware of the arbitration provision’s existence, let alone its meaning. The trial court refused to compel arbitration, concluding that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Daymar’s attempted incorporation was unsuccessful, and therefore, Plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration provision on the reverse side of the Agreement. View "Dixon v. Daymar Colleges Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Noatex Corp. and Kohn Law Group, Inc. appealed two district court decisions in an interpleader action brought by Auto Parts Manufacturing Mississippi, Inc. (“APMM”) that named Noatex, King Construction of Houston, L.L.C., and Kohn as claimants. Appellants claimed that the district court erred in discharging APMM from the action, enjoining all parties from filing any proceedings relating to the interpleader fund without a court order, and in denying their motion to compel arbitration. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Fifth circuit found no reversible error and affirmed the discharge of APMM and its accompanying injunction, the denial of appellants' motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings pending arbitration. King Construction was dismissed from these appeals, and appellants' alternative motion to vacate the trial court's rulings was denied. View "Auto Parts Mfg MS, Inc. v. King Const of Houston,LLC" on Justia Law