Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Three former or current employees of Cross Country Staffing, Inc. (plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit against their employer, alleging various labor law violations. Upon hiring, each plaintiff signed two agreements: an Arbitration Agreement mandating arbitration for all employment-related claims and an Employment Agreement that included provisions favoring the employer, such as non-compete clauses and the right to seek injunctive relief in court without posting a bond.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Cross Country Staffing's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the Arbitration Agreement, when read together with the Employment Agreement, was unconscionable. The court determined that the agreements were procedurally unconscionable due to their adhesive nature and substantively unconscionable because they unfairly favored the employer by allowing it to litigate its likely claims in court while forcing employees to arbitrate their likely claims. The court also noted the non-mutual attorney fees provisions and the employee's mandated concessions regarding injunctive relief.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the two agreements should be read together under Civil Code section 1642, as they were part of the same transaction and related to the same subject matter. The court found significant substantive unconscionability in the agreements' imbalance of arbitration obligations and the employer's access to court for its claims. The court also upheld the trial court's refusal to sever the unconscionable provisions, concluding that the agreements' unconscionability permeated the entire arbitration framework and that refusing to enforce the Arbitration Agreement served the interests of justice. View "Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Emergency air medical providers challenged award determinations made under the No Surprises Act (NSA). The NSA, enacted in 2022, protects patients from surprise bills for emergency services from out-of-network providers by creating an Independent Dispute Resolution (IDR) process for billing disputes between providers and insurers. Guardian Flight transported a patient in Nebraska, and a dispute arose with Aetna over the service value. Similarly, Guardian Flight and its affiliates provided emergency services to patients insured by Kaiser, leading to disputes over payment amounts. Both disputes were submitted to Medical Evaluators of Texas (MET) as the IDR entity, which sided with the insurers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas consolidated the cases. The court dismissed Guardian Flight’s claims against Aetna and Kaiser, ruling that the providers failed to plead sufficient facts to trigger vacatur of the awards. However, the court denied MET’s motion to dismiss based on arbitral immunity, leading to MET’s cross-appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the NSA does not provide a general private right of action to challenge IDR awards, incorporating Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provisions that allow courts to vacate awards only for specific reasons. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the providers’ claims against Aetna and Kaiser, finding that the providers did not allege facts sufficient to show that the awards were procured by fraud or undue means under the FAA.Additionally, the Fifth Circuit addressed MET’s claim of arbitral immunity. The court concluded that MET, functioning as a neutral arbiter in the IDR process, is entitled to the same immunity from suit typically enjoyed by arbitrators. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s judgment on this point and remanded with instructions to dismiss the providers’ claims against MET. View "Guardian Flight, L.L.C. v. Aetna Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael Satink, an employee of the City of Lakewood's Department of Public Works, was terminated for alleged insubordinate and inappropriate behavior. The union representing Satink, Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, filed a grievance, leading to a last-chance agreement (LCA) that reinstated Satink with the condition that any further misconduct would result in immediate termination without recourse to the grievance or arbitration provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA). Satink was terminated again for workplace misconduct, and the union filed another grievance. The city refused to arbitrate, citing the LCA, prompting the union to seek arbitration through the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.The common pleas court denied the city's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and granted the union's motion to compel arbitration. The city appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the State Employment Relations Board (SERB) had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter because the union's claims were dependent on collective-bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the union's claims did not allege an unfair labor practice or conduct constituting an unfair labor practice under R.C. 4117.11. Therefore, SERB did not have exclusive jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the right to arbitrate is a contractual right derived from the CBA, independent of R.C. Chapter 4117. The court also noted that R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) allows a party to bring a suit for a violation of a collective-bargaining agreement in a court of common pleas. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Lakewood" on Justia Law

Jessica Hines, a dancer, sued National Entertainment Group, LLC (NEG), an adult entertainment club, for failing to properly compensate its employees under various federal and state laws, including the Fair Labor Standards Act and Ohio wage laws. Hines had signed three separate Lease Agreement Waivers with NEG, each containing an arbitration provision. NEG moved to dismiss the suit or stay the proceedings pending arbitration, arguing that Hines had agreed to arbitrate any disputes.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied NEG’s motion to dismiss, finding that Hines had plausibly alleged sufficient facts to support standing. The court also denied NEG’s motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration, concluding that the arbitration provision was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, and thus unenforceable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s denial of NEG’s motion to stay. The appellate court held that the arbitration provision was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. The court found that Hines had reasonable opportunity to understand the plain terms of the arbitration clause, which were not hidden in fine print. The court also determined that the arbitration agreement was supported by adequate consideration and that any inconvenience or potential inconsistency caused by separate actions was not a legitimate basis for overriding the arbitration agreement.The Sixth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to consider the remaining factors under Stout v. J.D. Byrider, which include whether the claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement, whether Congress intended the federal claims to be arbitrable, and whether to stay the case pending arbitration if some but not all claims are subject to arbitration. View "Hines v. National Entertainment Group" on Justia Law

Monroe Operations, LLC, doing business as Newport Healthcare, hired Karla Velarde as a care coordinator and required her to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. Velarde was later terminated and filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination, retaliation, and violation of whistleblower protections. Newport Healthcare and its director of residential services, Amanda Seymour, filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. The court found that Velarde was pressured to sign the agreement, which she did not want to do, and that the agreement unlawfully prohibited her from seeking judicial review of an arbitration award.The Superior Court of Orange County ruled that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was presented as an adhesive contract buried among 31 documents that Velarde had to sign quickly while an HR manager waited. Additionally, Newport Healthcare's HR manager made false representations about the nature and terms of the agreement, which contradicted the written terms, rendering the agreement substantively unconscionable. The court denied the motion to compel arbitration based on these findings.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found ample evidence of procedural unconscionability due to the pressure and misrepresentations made by Newport Healthcare. The court also found substantive unconscionability because the agreement did not conform to Velarde's reasonable expectations and placed her in a disadvantageous position. The appellate court concluded that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable and affirmed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Velarde v. Monroe Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. entered into a satellite-leasing agreement with Antrix Corporation Ltd., a company owned by the Republic of India. The agreement was terminated by Antrix under a force majeure clause when the Indian Government decided it needed more satellite capacity for itself. Devas initiated arbitration, and the arbitral panel awarded Devas $562.5 million in damages plus interest. Devas sought to confirm the award in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which confirmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judgment against Antrix.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, finding that personal jurisdiction was lacking. The Ninth Circuit held that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), personal jurisdiction over a foreign state requires not only an immunity exception and proper service but also a traditional minimum contacts analysis as set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The court concluded that Antrix did not have sufficient suit-related contacts with the United States to establish personal jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that personal jurisdiction under the FSIA exists when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The Court determined that the FSIA does not require proof of minimum contacts beyond the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp." on Justia Law

Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. (Cashman) was contracted by Cardi Corporation, Inc. (Cardi) to construct marine cofferdams for the Sakonnet River Bridge project. Cashman then subcontracted Specialty Diving Services, Inc. (SDS) to perform underwater aspects of the cofferdam installation. Cardi identified deficiencies in the cofferdams and sought to hold Cashman responsible. Cashman believed it had fulfilled its contractual obligations and sued Cardi for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. Cardi counterclaimed, alleging deficiencies in Cashman's construction. Cashman later added SDS as a defendant, claiming breach of contract and seeking indemnity and contribution.The Superior Court denied SDS's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine disputes of material fact. The case proceeded to a jury-waived trial, after which SDS moved for judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice granted SDS's motion, finding Cashman failed to establish that SDS breached any obligations. SDS then moved for attorneys' fees, which the trial justice granted, finding Cashman's claims were unsupported by evidence and lacked justiciable issues of fact or law. The trial justice ordered mediation over attorneys' fees, resulting in a stipulated amount of $224,671.14, excluding prejudgment interest.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law, as Cashman failed to provide specific evidence of justiciable issues of fact. The Court also upheld the award of attorneys' fees, finding no abuse of discretion. Additionally, the Court determined that the attorneys' fees were not barred by the Bankruptcy Code, as they arose post-confirmation and were not contingent claims. View "Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. v. Cardi Corporation, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent George Zeber filed a workers' compensation claim for cumulative injury sustained during his employment with the New York Yankees from 1968 to 1978. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) found Zeber had a compensable injury but deferred any award pending further proceedings, including mandatory arbitration of the insurance coverage dispute. Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers) disputed the applicability of mandatory arbitration, arguing it only applies to injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1994, while Zeber's injury occurred no later than 1978.The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) found Zeber sustained an injury during his employment but deferred findings on permanent disability and other issues. The WCJ also found the statute of limitations did not bar Zeber’s claim, as he only became aware of his right to file a claim in 2017 or 2018. The WCJ determined the New York Yankees had insurance coverage provided by Travelers and noted that disputes involving the right of contribution must be sent to arbitration. Travelers filed for reconsideration, which the WCAB partially granted, amending the WCJ’s decision to defer the insurance coverage issue to mandatory arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that section 5275, subdivision (a)(1) applies only to injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1990. The WCJ had not made a finding on the date of injury for purposes of section 5275. The court annulled the WCAB’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a determination of the date of injury for the purposes of mandatory arbitration. The court emphasized that the "date of injury" for cumulative injuries should be determined under section 5412, which considers when the employee first suffered disability and knew or should have known it was work-related. View "Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Docs of CT and Biotek Services entered into arbitration over a contract dispute in April 2018. The arbitrator found Docs of CT in default regarding liability, and a hearing was scheduled to determine damages. Docs of CT failed to provide required discovery, leading the arbitrator to prohibit them from presenting evidence at the damages hearing. Docs of CT's counsel withdrew, and no new counsel appeared. The arbitrator communicated directly with Docs of CT's representative, Dr. Sidana, who was not allowed to present evidence at the hearing. The arbitrator awarded Biotek over $1.7 million in damages and fees.Docs of CT moved to vacate the arbitration award in superior court, citing arbitrator partiality and misconduct, supported by emails between the arbitrator and Biotek's attorneys. The trial court denied the motion, finding no demonstrated misconduct or partiality. The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that while the ex parte emails were improper, Docs of CT failed to show resulting prejudice.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine the standard for assessing prejudice due to ex parte communications in arbitration. The court held that to vacate an arbitral award under OCGA § 9-9-13 (b), the party must show that the conduct in question affected or influenced the arbitration's outcome. Docs of CT did not demonstrate how the ex parte communications prejudiced the outcome, failing to provide evidence or arguments that the arbitrator's decisions would have been different without the ex parte communications. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, upholding the arbitration award. View "DOCS OF CT, LLC v. BIOTEK SERVICES, LLC" on Justia Law

Edgar Osuna sued Spectrum Security Services, Inc., alleging violations of the California Labor Code. He brought five individual and class claims, and a sixth representative claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial court dismissed Osuna’s class claims, sent his individual claims to arbitration, and sustained Spectrum’s demurrer to his PAGA claim without leave to amend. The court concluded that Osuna lacked standing to bring the PAGA claim because he did not suffer a Labor Code violation within the one-year statute of limitations for recovering civil penalties.The trial court’s decision was based on the interpretation that Osuna needed to have suffered a violation within the one-year period before filing his PAGA notice. Osuna appealed, arguing that he is an aggrieved employee with standing to assert a representative PAGA claim because he suffered Labor Code violations during his employment with Spectrum.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the standing requirements under PAGA. The appellate court held that to have standing under PAGA, an employee must have been employed by the alleged violator and suffered at least one Labor Code violation, regardless of whether the violation occurred within the one-year statute of limitations for recovering civil penalties. The court emphasized that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and does not affect standing.The appellate court reversed the portion of the trial court’s order sustaining Spectrum’s demurrer to Osuna’s representative PAGA claim and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc." on Justia Law