The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in denying Waffle House's motion to compel arbitration in a case where plaintiff claimed that Waffle House and others violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act. In this case, the arbitration agreement contained a broad, valid, and enforceable delegation provision that expressed the parties' clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate gateway questions of arbitrability, including questions concerning the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, and formation of the agreement. The court rejected plaintiff's claims that the arbitration agreement improperly interfered with the district court's managerial authority over class actions or that the agreement amounted to an improper ex parte communication with a represented party. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to stay the case pending arbitration. View "Jones v. Waffle House, Inc." on Justia Law

For purposes of the Iskanian rule, the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) representative claims for civil penalties are limited to those where a portion of the recovery is allocated to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency. Claims for unpaid wages based on Labor Code section 558 are not allocated in this manner and, therefore, the Iskanian rule does not exempt such claims from arbitration. Applying the interpretation of the Iskanian rule and its term of art, civil penalties, to this litigation, the court concluded that some of the claims the employee was pursuing were PAGA representative claims that seek civil penalties. Under the Iskanian rule, those claims were not subject to arbitration. Therefore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order insofar as it denied arbitration of the representative claims for civil penalties and remanded for further proceedings. View "Esparza v. KS Industries, LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action seeking equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets and child support. Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to arbitrate the action under North Carolina’s Family Law Arbitration Act. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an equitable distribution arbitration award by consent. The trial court confirmed the award. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to vacate arbitration award and set aside order and motion to engage in discovery on the basis of Plaintiff’s alleged fraud. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to engage in discovery. The court of appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal, concluding that Plaintiff had no right to immediately appeal the trial court’s order denying discovery and that the trial court had no discretion to order post-confirmation discovery in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff had a right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to engage in discovery; and (2) the trial court had the discretion to order discovery in this case. View "Stokes v. Crumpton" on Justia Law

Marlene Baker LaBerge, a 73-year-old woman, was a resident and patient of a 24- hour skilled nursing facility owned by Italian Maple Holdings, LLC dba La Paloma Healthcare Center (La Paloma). LaBerge's heirs, Paul LaBerge, Suzanne Marx, and Talmadge Baker (collectively Plaintiffs) sued La Paloma and Plum Healthcare, LLC (together Defendants) for elder abuse, violations of the Patient's Bill of Rights as codified at Health and Safety Code section 1430, negligence, and wrongful death. In response, Defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration based on the two arbitration agreements that LaBerge had executed. The two arbitration agreements included language required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, subdivision (c), requiring such agreements to include a 30-day "cooling off" period, during which the parties to the agreement may rescind it. Ten days after LaBerge signed the agreements (and therefore, prior to the expiration of the statutorily-required 30- day rescission period), LaBerge passed away. The superior court denied the petition to compel arbitration, relying on Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 176 Cal.App.4th 1461 (2009) to conclude that the agreements were not effective until the 30-day rescission period passed without either party rescinding the agreements; because LaBerge died before the expiration of the 30-day rescission period, the agreements could not be given effect. On appeal, Defendants contended the trial court’s interpretation was wrong, and the Court of Appeal should decline to follow Rodriguez because that case was factually distinguishable from this case. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in interpreting section 1295, subdivision (c), and that the arbitration agreements were valid and enforceable. Pursuant to the plain language of section 1295, subdivision (c), the terms of those agreements governed the parties' relationship upon their execution; the fact that one signatory died before the expiration of the statutory 30-day rescission period does not render the terms of the parties' agreements unenforceable in the absence of other grounds for not enforcing them. View "Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings" on Justia Law

Marlene Baker LaBerge, a 73-year-old woman, was a resident and patient of a 24- hour skilled nursing facility owned by Italian Maple Holdings, LLC dba La Paloma Healthcare Center (La Paloma). LaBerge's heirs, Paul LaBerge, Suzanne Marx, and Talmadge Baker (collectively Plaintiffs) sued La Paloma and Plum Healthcare, LLC (together Defendants) for elder abuse, violations of the Patient's Bill of Rights as codified at Health and Safety Code section 1430, negligence, and wrongful death. In response, Defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration based on the two arbitration agreements that LaBerge had executed. The two arbitration agreements included language required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, subdivision (c), requiring such agreements to include a 30-day "cooling off" period, during which the parties to the agreement may rescind it. Ten days after LaBerge signed the agreements (and therefore, prior to the expiration of the statutorily-required 30- day rescission period), LaBerge passed away. The superior court denied the petition to compel arbitration, relying on Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 176 Cal.App.4th 1461 (2009) to conclude that the agreements were not effective until the 30-day rescission period passed without either party rescinding the agreements; because LaBerge died before the expiration of the 30-day rescission period, the agreements could not be given effect. On appeal, Defendants contended the trial court’s interpretation was wrong, and the Court of Appeal should decline to follow Rodriguez because that case was factually distinguishable from this case. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in interpreting section 1295, subdivision (c), and that the arbitration agreements were valid and enforceable. Pursuant to the plain language of section 1295, subdivision (c), the terms of those agreements governed the parties' relationship upon their execution; the fact that one signatory died before the expiration of the statutory 30-day rescission period does not render the terms of the parties' agreements unenforceable in the absence of other grounds for not enforcing them. View "Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings" on Justia Law

Prime filed suit against Kaiser, alleging that Kaiser failed to reimburse Prime for emergency medical services Prime provided to Kaiser members. On appeal, Kaiser challenged the trial court's denial of its petition to vacate an arbitration award. The Court of Appeal held that the merits of the confirmation of the panel's award on the Medicare Act preemption and exhaustion issues were not reviewable, either by appeal or by writ. Accordingly, the court issued a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its judgment confirming the "Partial Final Award Re Medicare Advantage Claims" that the arbitration panel issued, and to enter a new and different order dismissing Kaiser's petition to vacate that award. View "Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Prime filed suit against Kaiser, alleging that Kaiser failed to reimburse Prime for emergency medical services Prime provided to Kaiser members. On appeal, Kaiser challenged the trial court's denial of its petition to vacate an arbitration award. The Court of Appeal held that the merits of the confirmation of the panel's award on the Medicare Act preemption and exhaustion issues were not reviewable, either by appeal or by writ. Accordingly, the court issued a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its judgment confirming the "Partial Final Award Re Medicare Advantage Claims" that the arbitration panel issued, and to enter a new and different order dismissing Kaiser's petition to vacate that award. View "Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A surety who issued a performance bond on a subcontract was not bound by that contract’s arbitration clause when the surety was jointly and severally liable for the “performance of” the subcontract and the entire subcontract was incorporated into the bond by reference. Petitioner entered into a contract with an electrical subcontractor pursuant to a master subcontract agreement that included a mandatory arbitration clause. Petitioner later entered into a subcontract with the electrical subcontractor to perform work on a project. The subcontract incorporated the entire master subcontract agreement by reference. The subcontractor obtained a performance bond from Respondent stating that Respondent was jointly and severally liable for the performance of the construction contract, which was incorporated into the bond by reference. Petitioner terminated the subcontract after a dispute with the electrical subcontractor and filed a demand for arbitration that included Respondent. Respondent requested a declaratory judgment that it was not bound by the arbitration clause. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent. The court of special appeals affirmed, ruling that Respondent could not be compelled to participate in the pending arbitration proceedings between Petitioner and the electrical subcontractor. The Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons stated above. View "Schneider Electric Buildings Critical Systems, Inc. v. Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

A surety who issued a performance bond on a subcontract was not bound by that contract’s arbitration clause when the surety was jointly and severally liable for the “performance of” the subcontract and the entire subcontract was incorporated into the bond by reference. Petitioner entered into a contract with an electrical subcontractor pursuant to a master subcontract agreement that included a mandatory arbitration clause. Petitioner later entered into a subcontract with the electrical subcontractor to perform work on a project. The subcontract incorporated the entire master subcontract agreement by reference. The subcontractor obtained a performance bond from Respondent stating that Respondent was jointly and severally liable for the performance of the construction contract, which was incorporated into the bond by reference. Petitioner terminated the subcontract after a dispute with the electrical subcontractor and filed a demand for arbitration that included Respondent. Respondent requested a declaratory judgment that it was not bound by the arbitration clause. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent. The court of special appeals affirmed, ruling that Respondent could not be compelled to participate in the pending arbitration proceedings between Petitioner and the electrical subcontractor. The Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons stated above. View "Schneider Electric Buildings Critical Systems, Inc. v. Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

A court must decide whether an arbitration agreement authorizes class arbitration. The Eighth Circuit held that the question of class arbitration belongs with the courts as a substantive question of arbitrability; questions concerning "whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration" presumptively lie with the court; parties to an agreement may nonetheless commit the question to an arbitrator; and when dealing with class arbitration, the court sought clear and unmistakable evidence of an agreement to arbitrate the particular question of class arbitration. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying Catamaran's motion for summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court shall determine whether such a "contractual basis" for class arbitration exists in the agreements between Catamaran and the pharmacies. View "Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy" on Justia Law