Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the circuit court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Nutt & McAlister, PLLC; David Nutt & Associates, PC; David H. Nutt; and Mary Krichbaum McAlister (“Nutt, et al.”) sought to enforce the mandatory arbitration provision in a contract titled “In Re: Katrina Litigation Joint Venture Agreement” (“Katrina JVA”). In a prior appeal, the Supreme Court settled the issue as to whether Appellee Wyatt’s claims were related to the Katrina JVA. The sole issue for determination then was whether the trial court erred by finding that Nutt, et al., waived their right to enforce the provision. Upon review, the Court concluded that Nutt, et al., did not waive their right to compel arbitration. The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded this case with instructions to refer Wyatt’s claims to arbitration. View "Nutt v. Wyatt" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff became the subject of a federal indictment, the school department (Defendant) suspended her without pay from her position as a school adjustment counselor. Ultimately, the indictment was dismissed. Plaintiff sought reinstatement to her position, but Defendant terminated her employment. Plaintiff filed a grievance challenging the termination, and an arbitrator ordered that she be reinstated. Plaintiff then filed an action seeking confirmation of the arbitration award and back pay for the period of her suspension an the period between her termination and reinstatement. The superior court affirmed the arbitration award but granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to Plaintiff's back pay claims. The appeals court affirmed the denial of back pay with respect to the period between Plaintiff's termination and reinstatement but reversed with respect to the period of her suspension. The Supreme Court affirmed. Remanded. View "Serrazina v. Springfield Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joe F. Watkins, Patricia M. Smith, and RE/MAX Lake Martin Properties, LLC sued Bear Brothers, Inc., ETC Lake Development, LLC ("ETC Lake"), and E.T. "Bud" Chambers, among others, asserting claims related to the construction and development of a condominium project on Lake Martin. ETC Lake and Chambers crossclaimed against Bear Brothers seeking to recover losses suffered on the project as well as indemnification for the costs of litigating the plaintiffs' action and any damages for which they might be found liable to the plaintiffs. In January 2010, Bear Brothers moved the circuit court to compel arbitration of the cross-claim against it. The circuit court did not rule on that motion. Bear Brothers renewed its motion in July 2011, and the circuit court granted the motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim in December. Bear Brothers then moved the circuit court "to stay [the] proceedings [in the plaintiffs' action] pending the outcome of a related arbitration." After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion to stay. Bear Brothers appealed the circuit court's order denying the motion to stay to the Supreme Court; ETC Lake and Chambers moved to dismiss the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the motion at issue in this case was a motion to stay related proceedings pending the arbitration of a crossclaim between codefendants and was filed separately from the initial motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim and subsequent to the circuit court's order granting the motion. Thus, Bear Brothers did not demonstrate a right to appeal the denial of the motion to stay at this time, and accordingly the Court dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. View "Bear Brothers, Inc. v. ETC Lake Development, LLC" on Justia Law

A nursing home patient (Decedent) signed an agreement providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of treatment and care at the nursing home. Decedent subsequently died, allegedly through the nursing home's negligence. Through Decedent's personal representative, Decedent's survivors (Plaintiffs) subsequently brought a cause of action for deprivation of rights under the applicable nursing home statute and, alternatively, a wrongful death action. At issue on appeal was whether an arbitration agreement signed by the decedent requires his estate and heirs to arbitrate their wrongful death claims. The court of appeal concluded that the estate and heirs were bound by the arbitration agreement but certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Court approved of the court of appeal's decision and answered that the execution of a nursing home arbitration agreement by a patient with capacity to contract binds the patient's estate and statutory heirs in a subsequent wrongful death action arising from an alleged tort within the scope of the valid arbitration agreement. View "Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five retail grocers, each attempting to bring class-action antitrust claims against one of two wholesale grocers, appealed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs claims from the putative class action. The court held that the non-signatory defendants could not use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration of plaintiffs' claims. Since the district court found the equitable estoppel issue dispositive, it did not address the successor-in-interest argument and therefore, the court remanded for the district court to consider this argument in the first instance. The court concluded that the remaining public policy arguments were moot or the court declined to issue an advisory opinion. View "King Cole Foods, Inc., et al v. SuperValu, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

The railroad fired a locomotive engineer, Narron. The union filed a grievance, which eventually came before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, which ordered the railroad to reinstate Narron with back pay but authorized the railroad to offset the back pay by any earnings that he had obtained between his firing and his reinstatement. The union filed a petition in the district court challenging that part of the award. The district judge remanded for determination of whether Narron had had any such earnings and ordered the earnings-offset provision vacated. The Seventh Circuit vacated the order, holding that the district court exceeded its authority. A district court may set aside a Board order only “for failure of the division to comply with the requirements of [the Railway Labor Act]” or “to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the division’s jurisdiction,” or “for fraud or corruption by a member of the division,” 45 U.S.C. 153. View "Bhd of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainment v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the enforceability of a binding arbitration clause included within a debt adjustment contract. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the motion was untimely and that the binding arbitration clause was unconscionable. Upon review of the trial court record and the clause at issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the clause was unconscionable, which then required the Court to decide whether this conclusion as to the validity of the binding arbitration clause is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Finding no preemption, the Court affirmed. View "Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Morgan Keegan filed an action seeking to enjoin arbitration proceedings on the ground that under the controlling FINRA Rule, defendants were not "customers" of Morgan Keegan entitled to compel arbitration of their dispute. In their FINRA arbitration claim, defendants asserted that Morgan Keegan engaged in misconduct relating to the valuation and marketing of certain bond funds purchased by defendants through their brokerage firm. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in holding that Morgan Keegan was not subject to FINRA arbitration. The court affirmed the district court's judgment because defendants were not "customers" of Morgan Keegan, within the meaning of the disputed FINRA Rule 12200, and, therefore, were not entitled to invoke the mandatory arbitration provision contained in that rule. View "Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Silverman" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondents entered into a contract for the purchase of real property owned by Petitioners, twenty-five percent of which constituted wetlands. Respondents filed an action against Petitioners for fraudulent misrepresentation, alleging that in the advertisement for the sale of the property, Petitioners knowingly and falsely misrepresented that the property had no wetlands. Petitioners moved to dismiss, asserting that the fraud claim arose out of, and was related to, the contract, and therefore, the claim fell within the arbitration provision of the contract. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the action based on fraud was not a dispute subject to arbitration under the contract. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and concluded that the fraud action had a contractual nexus with, and a significant relationship to, the contract between Petitioners and Respondents and was, as a general principle, within the scope of the contract's broad arbitration provision. Remanded. View "Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc." on Justia Law

H. Gordon Myrick, Inc. (Myrick) contracted with Harrison County Commercial Lot (HCCL) to build HCCL an executive office building. The parties' contract contained an arbitration provision, which excluded aesthetic-effect claims from arbitration. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned which, if any, of the parties' claims were subject to arbitration. The trial court determined that the arbitration agreement was valid and ordered arbitration on designated, nonaesthetic claims. HCCL appealed and Myrick cross-appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the parties' claims were without merit, "but it is difficult to determine why the trial court ordered certain punch-list items to arbitration and others not. Thus, [the Court] remand[ed the case] to the trial court to provide further explanation on the punch-list items alone." View "Harrison County Commercial Lot, LLC v. H. Gordon Myrick, Inc." on Justia Law