Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

This case arose from an employee grievance at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC. After succeeding in arbitration, the employee, John Horne, filed a lawsuit in state district court in 2008, in which he alleged more expansive claims arising out of the same subject matter covered in the arbitration agreement. LANL objected, claiming that it should not have to defend against claims that either were subject to arbitration or were waived by the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case opinion to discuss the consequences that follow when an employee voluntarily contracts to arbitrate grievances and what the employee must do to preserve a subsequent lawsuit if that is his intention. In this case the Court sided with the district court's ruling in favor of LANL, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Horne v. Los Alamos Nat'l Sec., L.L.C." on Justia Law

Richmont Holdings purchased the assets of Superior Recharge Systems. The terms of the sales were set out in a purchase agreement that included a provision for binding arbitration of any dispute relating to the agreement. In connection with the sale, Richmont Holdings agreed to hire John Blake for a period of two years. The employment agreement did not include an arbitration provision. Six months later, Blake's employment was terminated. Blake sued Richmont. Richmont answered and later moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Richmont waived its arbitration rights because it had substantially invoked the judicial process. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds, holding that the parties did not have a valid agreement to arbitrate because the dispute arose exclusively out of the employment agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals' failure to recognize the arbitration agreement at issue in this case was contrary to the Court's precedent, which mandates enforcement of such an agreement absent proof of a defense. Remanded to consider the waiver of defense raised below. View "Richmont Holdings, Inc v. Superior Recharge Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Nancy Belcher was the designated health care surrogate of decedent Beulah Wyatt. Belcher signed an arbitration agreement that was presented to her when she sought to admit Wyatt to the McDowell Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (McDowell Nursing). Wyatt died after living ten months in the nursing home. Lelia Baker subsequently filed a wrongful death suit against McDowell Nursing alleging that its negligent care of Wyatt caused and/or contributed to her death. McDowell Nursing filed a motion to dismiss and to enforce the arbitration agreement. The circuit court denied the motion and concluded that the agreement was unenforceable because Belcher did not have the authority to waive Wyatt's right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court denied McDowell Nursing's subsequent request for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order, holding that Belcher, as a health care surrogate, did not have the authority to enter the arbitration agreement because it was not a health care decision and was not required for Wyatt's receipt of nursing home services from McDowell Nursing. View "State ex rel. AMFM, LLC v. Circuit Court (King)" on Justia Law

Carilion initiated an arbitration proceeding against UBS and Citi under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) Rule 12200, which required FINRA members to arbitrate disputes with a customer at the customer's request. UBS and Citi commenced this action to enjoin the arbitration proceedings, contending that Carilion was not a "customer" as that term was used in FINRA Rule 12200 and that, in any event, Carilion waived any right to arbitrate by agreeing to the forum selection clause contained in written agreements with UBS and Citi. The court concluded that Carilion, by purchasing UBS and Citi's services, was indeed a "customer" entitled to arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 and that the forum selection clause did not have the effect of superseding or waiving Carilion's right to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of UBS and Citi's motion for injunctive relief. View "UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Carilion Clinic" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's judgment denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granting the motion for summary judgment by Lloyds. At issue was whether federal common law or state law provided the meaning of "arbitration" within the Federal Arbitration Act, 8 U.S.C. 201-208. The court held that the meaning of "arbitration" under the Act was governed by federal common law. The court concluded that the district court properly decided that it had subject matter jurisdiction over this suit by applying cases resting in federal common law and that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lloyds. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London" on Justia Law

First Franklin Financial Corporation and Jason Gardner attended foreclosure mediation. The parties disputed the outcome of the mediation. Gardner argued that the parties reached a binding agreement requiring First Franklin to offer a trial loan modification plan to Gardner and subsequently filed a motion for sanctions. The district court granted the motion and ordered First Franklin to pay monetary sanctions and to enter into a loan modification with Gardner on the terms agreed upon by the parties at foreclosure mediation. First Franklin filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and held that the motion court did not err (1) in finding that Gardner and First Franklin entered into a binding agreement requiring First Franklin to offer the loan modification to Gardner; and (2) in finding that First Franklin did not mediate in good faith and in granting Gardner's motion for sanctions. View "First Franklin Fin. Corp. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Bristol Care appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration in a suit initiated by its former employee asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and seeking class action certification. Given the absence of any contrary congressional command from the FLSA that a right to engage in class actions overrides the mandate of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 3-4, in favor of arbitration, the court held that arbitration agreements containing class waivers were enforceable in claims brought under the FLSA. Because the court concluded that the Mandatory Arbitration Agreement (MAA) signed by the employee and Bristol Care was enforceable, the court reversed the district court's decision and directed the district court to enter an order granting Bristol Care's motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. View "Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit against several power companies alleging that the Colstrip power facility, which bordered land owned by Plaintiffs, contaminated groundwater under their property. The parties proceeded with mediation after three years of litigation. The mediation ended with the transmission of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to the parties' counsel. After some of Plaintiffs expressed reservations about accepting the settlement, the power companies filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that the MOU was a written and signed settlement agreement. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion to enforce the settlement agreement, finding that the MOU was a binding, enforceable settlement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by finding the MOU was an enforceable settlement agreement; (2) did not err by allowing parol evidence to change an option to purchase into a right of first refusal; and (3) erred in admitting evidence protected by the mediation confidentiality statute, but the error was harmless. View "Kluver v. PPL Mont., LLC" on Justia Law

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS) signed an employment agreement with Plaintiff containing a clause to compel arbitration for any disputes regarding the employment agreement. After Plaintiff's employment was terminated, Plaintiff brought an action against BCBS claiming that BCBS violated the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA). Plaintiff, however, could bring a WDEA claim only if she did not have a written contract of employment for a specific term. The district court compelled arbitration to allow the arbitrator to determine in the first instance whether Plaintiff had a term employment contract. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order to compel arbitration, holding that because the instant dispute implicated the terms or provisions of the employment agreement, the district court correctly determined that an arbitrator should decide, in the first instance, whether Plaintiff was an at-will employee or whether she had a term contract. View "Marsden v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal involved litigation between Coverall North America, Inc. and its franchisees. Proceeding under federal diversity jurisdiction, the franchisees asserted a variety of state-law claims against Coverall. Which of the various plaintiffs were subject to the arbitration provisions of the Franchise Agreement was at issue in this appeal. Appellees were a subgroup of Plaintiffs who became Coverall franchisees by signing consent to transfer agreements, which by reference incorporated under franchise agreements that contained arbitration clauses. The district court determined that Appellees did not have to arbitrate their claims against Coverall because they did not have adequate notice of the arbitration clauses contained in the franchise agreements. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court erred because (1) Massachusetts law, which governed this dispute, did not impose any such special notice requirement upon these commercial contractual provisions; and (2) in any event, any special notice requirement would be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Awuah v. Coverall N.A., Inc. " on Justia Law