Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

A general contractor (Carlisle) for a construction project contracted with Plaintiff to perform carpentry work for the project. A bond was issued for the project. Carlisle was the principal on the bond, and International Fidelity Insurance Company (IFIC) was the surety. Plaintiff later filed suit against Carlisle and IFIC seeking to recover payment for the work it performed. The arbitrator issued two amended awards. Plaintiff moved the superior court to confirm the second amended awarded concerning Carlisle's liability and to modify it as to IFIC. The trial justice remanded the matter back to the arbitrator for a determination as to IFIC's liability. The arbitrator on remand found that both Carlisle and IFIC were liable to Plaintiff for $43,543. The trial justice confirmed the post-remand arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the second amended award should have been vacated under R.I. Stat. 37-16-18(2), and the trial justice was authorized, under section 37-16-19, to remand the case to the same arbitrator for a hearing; and (2) because the remand in this case accomplished the same result that could have been accomplished under section 37-16-18 and 37-16-19, the judgment was affirmed. View "Drago Custom Interiors, LLC v. Carlisle Bldg. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

A dispute between a bank customer (Customer) and her bank (Bank) over missing endorsements was submitted to arbitration through the American Arbitration Association. The arbitrator issued a written award in Bank's favor and then granted Bank's motion for an order confirming the arbitration award and for entry of judgment on the order. Customer objected, arguing that, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 38.239, she should have been afforded the opportunity to oppose the motion to confirm and/or to file a competing motion to vacate, modify, or correct the award. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court erred in summarily confirming the arbitration award against Customer without giving Customer the opportunity to be heard in opposition to the motion to confirm, even though the ninety-day period for Customer to move to vacate, modify, or correct the award had yet to run. View "Casey v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Illini Concrete formally ceased doing business in October 2009 and sold certain of its assets, including delivery trucks, to Kienstra. The Teamsters Local Union, which represents concrete mixer drivers and others employed by Illini and then by Kienstra, alleged that Kienstra laid off 14employees, declined to make good on Illini’s unfunded liability to its employees’ union pension fund, subcontracted work to competitors to avoid hiring back union employees,and refused to hear grievances regarding the asset sale and its effect on the employees. The Union claimed that the asset sale was a ruse to allow Illini to evade obligations under its collective bargaining agreement and sought a declaration that Kienstra is Illini’s alter ego, bound by the CBA. The district court denied motions to compel arbitration. Kienstra and Illini Concrete filed an interlocutory appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, which states that “nothing [in the FAA] shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” View "Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC" on Justia Law

Nitro-Lift contracts with operators of oil and gas wells to provide services. Howard and Schneider entered a confidentiality-noncompetition agreement with Nitro-Lift that contained an arbitration clause” After working for Nitro-Lift on wells in Oklahoma, Texas, and Arkansas, they quit and began working for one of Nitro-Lift’s competitors. Nitro-Lift served them with a demand for arbitration. The former employees filed suit Oklahoma, asking the court to declare the agreements void and enjoin enforcement. The court dismissed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered the parties to show cause why the matter should not be resolved by application of Okla. Stat., Tit. 15, 219A, which limits the enforceability of noncompetition agreements. Nitro-Lift argued that any dispute as to the contracts’ enforceability was a question for the arbitrator. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the existence of an arbitration agreement in an employment contract does not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated, holding that the state court misconstrued the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, which favors arbitration. View "Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard" on Justia Law

Paul brought state law claims for disability discrimination and retaliation against her former employer after her 12-year employment as a CT Technologist came to an end following a work-related injury. The employer removed the action to federal court on the basis of complete preemption under the Labor Management Relations Act, contending plaintiff’s claims implicated rights under the collective bargaining agreement, which included a mandatory arbitration requirement. The district court denied remand to state court and dismissed for failure to submit to mandatory arbitration. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Although plaintiff’s claim of unlawful discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment by refusing to reasonably accommodate her disability implicates an employment relationship created and defined by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the employer did not demonstrate that resolution of the claim is so “inextricably intertwined” with interpretation of CBA terms as to trigger complete preemption. View "Paul v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of OH" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Nevada homeowner, elected mediation pursuant to the Nevada Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) to produce a loan modification. When the mediation did not result in a loan modification, Appellant filed a petition for judicial review asking for sanctions against Respondent, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (BAC), alleging that BAC failed to comply with the FMP's document production and good faith requirements. The district court rejected Appellant's petition, finding (1) there was no irregularity as to the submitted documents; (2) BAC met its burden of showing a lack of bad faith; and (3) absent a timely appeal, a letter of certification would issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although BAC's document production lacked a key assignment, Appellant filled the gap with a document he produced; and (2) the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions and allowing the FMP certificate to issue. View "Einhorn v. BAC Homes Loans Servicing" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Title VII discrimination suit against his employer, the Department of Homeland Security. At issue on appeal was whether the parties had reached an enforceable settlement. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that plaintiff was bound by the terms of his attorney's settlement offer. Further, the court never held that the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee was implicated by defective representation in Title VII proceedings and plaintiff had introduced no evidence to suggest that his attorney's representation was less than competent. View "Quesada v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal stemmed from a lawsuit in which Mark Wolgin sued various entities alleging wrongdoing surrounding his 2006 purchase of a condominium on the Gulf Coast. In case #2010-CA-00653-SCT, Wolgin appealed the Chancery Court's decision to dismiss two credit reporting agencies (Trans Union LLC and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian")), finding that claims against them were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). In case #2010-CA-01177-SCT, the broker for the sale, The Power Broker, Inc. ("Power Broker"), appealed the Chancery Court's decision to order discovery on the scope of the mandatory arbitration clause in the "Contract for the Sale and Purchase of Real Estate" instead of fully granting its "Motion to Compel Arbitration." Regarding Wolgin's appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the credit reporting agencies, as Wolgin's claims are preempted by the FCRA. As to Power Broker's appeal, the Court reversed the trial court judgment ordering discovery and remanded the case with instructions to stay the proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration. View "Wolgin v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a putative class action in state court against Santander alleging violations of various Maryland consumer protection laws for undisclosed finance charges and other unfair business practices. Santander subsequently appealed from the district court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration and stay court proceedings of plaintiff's claims against it. While finding that an enforceable arbitration agreement encompassing plaintiff's claims existed, the district court nevertheless concluded that Santander had waived its rights to enforce arbitration by its delay. The court concluded that the record did not support the district court's finding of waiver. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with directions to defer the claims to arbitration. View "Rota-McLarty v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued General Steel, Discount Steel, and those companies' presidents for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy, based on their filing an arbitration complaint against him. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by (1) refusing to include additional elements reflecting the heightened standard in Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court (POME) in the jury instruction for Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims; and (2) trebling an exemplary damages award against Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) POME does not apply where, as here, the underlying alleged petitioning activity was the filing of an arbitration complaint that led to a purely private dispute; (2) therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to include additional elements reflecting POME's heightened standard in the jury instruction for Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims; and (3) the trial court did not err by trebling the exemplary damages award against Defendants. View "Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Bacheller" on Justia Law