Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

A collective-bargaining agreement between Baltimore County and Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 4 (FOP) contained an arbitration clause and a retiree health-insurance provision. FOP believed the provision locked in place the health-insurance subsidy as it existed at the time of an officer's retirement. After the agreement expired and the County decreased the health-insurance subsidy, FOP initiated arbitration. The County protested, arguing (1) it had no duty to arbitrate because the collective-bargaining agreement had expired, and (2) the health-insurance subsidy was not locked in place but was subject to change from year to year. FOP was successful in arbitration and on appeal before the circuit court, but the court of special appeals vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) an arbitration clause may survive the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement when it concerns rights that vested during the life of the agreement; and (2) when deciding the issue of arbitrability requires interpretation of the underlying agreement and consideration of the merits of the dispute, the issue of arbitrability should initially be determined by the arbitrator. View "Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police Lodge v. Baltimore County" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over annuity payments. Counter Defendants, RSL, appealed the district court's decision to abstain based on the doctrine of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States. Under the Colorado River doctrine, a court could abstain from a case that was part of parallel, duplicative litigation under "exceptional circumstances." The court examined the six relevant factors under Colorado River and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should determine whether RSL was entitled to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. 3. The district court must determine in the first instance whether any issues or claims decided by the state court were entitled to preclusive effect. View "Saucier v. Aviva Life and Annuity Co." on Justia Law

SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC, doing business as Warren Manor Health & Rehabilitation Center ("SSC"), and Bernard Turk, the administrator of Warren Manor Health & Rehabilitation Center ("Warren Manor") (referred to collectively as "the Warren Manor defendants"), appealed a circuit court judgment denying their joint motion to compel arbitration of the medical-malpractice wrongful-death claims asserted against them by Ethel Gordon ("Gordon"), the administratrix of the estate of Jimmy Lee Gordon, Gordon's husband, pursuant to an arbitration agreement they allege Gordon had entered into with SSC. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the circuit court properly denied the Warren Manor defendants' motion to compel arbitration of Gordon's claims against them because the trial court had yet to conduct a trial to resolve the issue identified by the Supreme Court in "Gordon I" — whether a valid arbitration agreement existed between Gordon and SSC. "Only if that issue is answered in the affirmative may the Warren Manor defendants properly move to compel arbitration. If that trial results in a judgment holding that there is no valid arbitration agreement, then the Warren Manor defendants may file a timely appeal challenging the trial court's ruling excluding any evidence they wished to submit at trial." View "SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC v. Gordon" on Justia Law

This case was before the Supreme Court upon the appeal of Petitioner from an order of the circuit court granting Respondents' motion for summary judgment and dismissing Petitioner's lawsuit. The court ruled that arbitration clauses in Petitioner's investment contracts were not unconscionable and enforceable. Petitioner alleged the circuit court erred in (1) requiring him to prove the arbitration clauses in the paries' agreements were independently enforceable under federal law rather than applying West Virginia law and finding those agreements unenforceable; (2) failing to find the agreements' arbitration clauses independently unenforceable; (3) refusing to find one respondent's deposition testimony an unresponsive and evasive effort to deprive Petitioner of any opportunity to conduct meaningful discovery; and (4) failing to enforce a respondent's offer to repay Petitioner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court's order lacked the findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary for the Supreme Court to conduct a meaningful appellate review. View "Grayiel v. Appalachian Energy Partners 2001-D, LLP" on Justia Law

The United States court of appeals certified a question to the West Virginia Supreme Court that concerned two areas of state law: the law of contract formation and the doctrine of unconscionability. The question from the court of appeals arose from a contract that contained an arbitration provision requiring one party to the contract to arbitrate all of their claims but allowed the other party to file a lawsuit for some of its claims. A federal district court previously determined that the arbitration provision was not enforceable because it lacked mutuality of obligation and mutuality of consideration. The Supreme Court concluded (1) West Virginia's law of contract formation only required that a contract as a whole be supported by adequate consideration, and hence, a single clause within a multi-clause contract does not require separate consideration when the contract as a whole is supported by adequate consideration; but (2) under the doctrine of unconscionability, a trial court may decline to enforce a contract clause, such as an arbitration provision, if the obligations or rights created by the clause unfairly lack mutuality. View "Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson" on Justia Law

AdvancePCS is a prescription benefits manager for plans sponsored by employers, unions, and others and is retained to achieve savings by negotiating discounts from drug manufacturers, providing mail order service, contracting with retail pharmacies, and electronic processing and paying of claims. Plaintiffs are retail pharmacies that entered into agreements with AdvancePCS that include an agreed reimbursement rate and an arbitration clause. In 2003, plaintiffs filed suit, asserting that AdvancePCS engaged in an unlawful conspiracy with plan sponsors to restrain competition in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; that AdvancePCS used the economic power of its sponsors to reduce the contractual amount it pays below levels prevailing in a competitive marketplace; and that the agreements impose other limitations. For almost a year, AdvancePCS litigated without mentioning arbitration. After denial of a motion to dismiss and reconsideration, AdvancePCS filed an answer with affirmative defenses, then sought to compel arbitration. The court granted the motion. Plaintiffs did not initiate arbitration, but sought dismiss pending appeal. A different judge vacated the order compelling arbitration. The Third Circuit remanded with directions to reinstate the order compelling arbitration. On remand, a third judge granted dismissal. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of plaintiffs, holding that AdvancePCS waived its right to arbitrate. View "In Re: Pharmacy Benefit Mgrs. Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thirty-five children living near a smelting facility in Peru, alleged that environmental contamination injured them. Plaintiffs claimed that contamination was caused by the owners and operators of the facility. Defendants' associate, Renco, is currently arbitrating related claims with Peru. Defendants moved to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration. The court held that the issues in the arbitration could conceivably affect the outcome of this case and the case was properly removed under 9 U.S.C. 205 and that the court did not have pendant appellate jurisdiction over defendants' discretionary-stay claim. The court also held that the issues in this case relate to the arbitration but were not referable to arbitration. Accordingly, the district court properly denied a mandatory stay under 9 U.S.C. 3. View "Sr. Kate Reid, et al v. Doe Run Resources Corp., et al" on Justia Law

Southeast Construction, L.L.C. ("SEC") appealed a circuit court's judgment and WAR Construction, Inc. ("WAR") filed a cross-appeal (which was treated as a petition for a writ of mandamus). The matter came before the Supreme Court following the appeal of the entry of the arbitration panel's ruling on the parties' respective construction contract claims. The decision resulted in a net award to WAR of $373,929. SEC filed a motion for modification of the award. WAR responded with a "Motion for Clerk's Entry of Arbitration Award as Final Judgment" pursuant to Rule 71C, Ala. R. Civ. P. The circuit court entered an order in which it declined to have the award entered as a judgment at that time. Eventually the court did enter an order based upon the arbitration award, and the parties appealed. "Given the nature of the award made by the arbitrators in this case and the nature of the resulting judgment the circuit court properly ordered the clerk to enter, it is apparent that the circuit court must take some additional responsibility for enforcing that award and the resulting judgment. To the extent WAR complain[ed] in its petition of the circuit court's reluctance to do so, [the Supreme Court agreed] with WAR" and, accordingly, ordered the circuit court to take appropriate action to enforce the judgment it has entered based upon the arbitrators' award. View "Southeast Construction, L.L.C. v. WAR Construction, Inc. " on Justia Law

Under the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, the City of Newport provided health insurance benefits to its retired firefighters. After the City decided to modify those benefits, Local 1080, International Association of Firefighters, ALF-CIO (Union) filed grievances and sought arbitration. The City responded by seeking relief in the superior court to determine the arbitrability of disputes over changes to these benefits. The superior court determined that this dispute was not arbitrable. The Union disagreed and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the parties did not intend to arbitrate disputes regarding retiree healthcare, and therefore, such disputes must be resolved, if at all, judicially rather than through arbitration. View "City of Newport v. Local 1080, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

West commenced this diversity action to recover expenses incurred in defending Miller in a garnishment action, asserting tort claims under Missouri law against RLI for vexatious refusal to pay, bad faith refusal to pay, and prima facie tort, and claims of negligence and negligent misrepresentations against RLI's independent claims agent, ASCK. West also sought a declaration that it owed no duty to protect RLI in the underlying arbitration. RLI counter claimed, alleging that, prior to the arbitration, West negligently and in bad faith refused to settle the underlying claims for less than its policy limits. West's response added claims for indemnification and contribution against ASCK. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment dismissing RLI's refusal-to-settle counterclaim and remanded for further proceedings. The court declined to review the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing West's affirmative defenses to the counterclaim. In all other respects, the court affirmed the district court's orders and judgment. View "West American Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co., et al" on Justia Law