Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, current and former customers of AT&T, filed a class action against AT&T, alleging unjust enrichment and and breach of contract. AT&T responded by seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement contained in its contracts with plaintiffs. The district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on state-law unconscionability grounds, relying primarily on the agreement's class-action waiver provision. The court reversed the district court's substantive unconscionability ruling where the FAA preempted the Washington state law invalidating the class-action waiver. The court remanded for further proceedings related to plaintiffs' procedural unconscionability claims for the district court to apply Washington choice-of-law rules. View "Coneff, et al. v. AT&T Corp, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen of the Philippines, brought suit against defendants for damages arising from severe injuries he sustained aboard the M/V Asian Spirit in the Chesapeake Bay near Baltimore. Plaintiff's complaint alleged multiple clams against defendants, including unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, breach of contract, violation of the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313(i), and negligence under general maritime law and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104. The court affirmed the district court's judgment that the Arbitration Clause at issue was enforceable and that plaintiff must arbitrate his claims against defendants in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the court vacated the dismissal of the case and remanded for reinstatement thereof, for assessment of the injunction request, for entry of a stay pending arbitration to ensure that plaintiff would have an opportunity at the award-enforcement stage for judicial review of his public policy defense based on the prospective waiver doctrine, and for such other and further proceedings. View "Aggarao, Jr. v. Mol Ship Mgmt. Co." on Justia Law

PTO sought review of a decision of the FLRA upholding an arbitrator's award in favor of the Union. The arbitrator concluded that PTO committed an unfair labor practice in violation of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7116(a)(1) and (5), when it repudiated a provision in an agreement requiring that it make an annual request of the OPM to increase PTO's special schedule pay rates and, if OPM refused, to discuss "substantially equivalent alternatives" with POPA. PTO challenged the FLRA's determination that the provision constituted an "appropriate arrangement" under 5 U.S.C. 7106(b)(3). The court granted PTO's petition on the ground that, under the collateral estoppel doctrine, the FLRA was bound by its earlier decision concluding the provision did not constitute an appropriate arrangement. View "U.S. Dept. of Commerce v. FLRA" on Justia Law

When plaintiff, a nurse, was hired in 2006 and rehired in 2009, she signed the hospital's forms, including an agreement to submit all disputes to binding arbitration. She acknowledged receipt of a brochure that outlines an internal grievance process culminating in arbitration, as well as the parameters of the arbitration agreement itself, but does not state that claims regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement itself must be arbitrated. In 2009 plaintiff filed a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-19, and state law. The district court denied a motion to compel arbitration. The Third Circuit reversed, finding no genuine disputes of material fact that might render the arbitration agreement unconscionable and unenforceable. View "Quilloin v. Tenet Healthsystem Philadelphia, Inc." on Justia Law

Conoco appealed the district court's judgment confirming an arbitration award favorable to Rain. Conoco and Rain were parties to a long-term supply agreement, whereby Conoco agreed to sell all green anode coke produced at one of its refineries during a certain time period. The court held that, given the considerable deference afforded arbitration awards, Conoco's argument that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by failing to select only one proposal, which relied on paragraphs stricken from the final award in accordance with the Commercial Rules, must fail. The court also held that vacatur was no appropriate and the award must be enforced where the arbitrator laid out the facts, described the contentions of the parties, and decided which of the two proposals should prevail. View "Rain CII Carbon, L.L.C. v. ConocoPhillips Co." on Justia Law

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved two different statutory schemes awarding attorney fees. One scheme, RCW 7.06.050-.060, discourages frivolous appeals from mandatory arbitration. The other scheme, RCW 4.84.250-.300, encourages parties to settle before going to court in cases where the amount in controversy is $10,000 or less by allowing a plaintiff to recover attorney fees if the plaintiff makes an offer of settlement at least 10 days before the initial trial, the offer is rejected, and the plaintiff recovers more than was offered. The question before the Court was whether the second scheme may be invoked for the first time 10 days before a trial de novo, rather than 10 days before the arbitration hearing, by a plaintiff that appealed an arbitration decision. After success at the trial de novo, Plaintiffs Patrick Williams and Andrea Harris applied for and received prevailing party attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250. Plaintiffs argued that although they offered to settle for under $10,000 after the mandatory arbitration, RCW 4.84.250-.300 allowed them to recover attorney fees as long as they made their offers 10 days before the trial de novo. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that RCW 4.84.250-.300 applies only to a plaintiff that seeks recovery of $10,000 or less and makes an offer of settlement 10 days before the initial hearing whether it is a trial or an arbitration. View "Williams v. Tilaye" on Justia Law

Insured, who was injured, submitted a claim to Insurer under her underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage after exhausting the policy limits of the underinsured motorist. An arbitration panel concluded that the court of appeals decision in Heritage Mutual v. Graser precluded Insured from recovering under her UIM coverage the value of medical expenses that were written off by her medical provider. The circuit court modified the arbitration award to include the reasonable value of the written-off medical expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration panel's decision in this case was properly modified by the circuit court because the arbitrators exceeded their authority by failing to fully review the Court's decisions on the collateral source rule and the law of damages. The Court overruled Graser to the extent that it held that the collateral source rule had no application in cases involving UIM coverage, because according to precedent, an injured party is entitled to recover the reasonable value of medical services, which, under the operation of the collateral source rule, includes written-off medical expenses. View "Orlowski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this putative class action against KeyBank, alleging violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, in connection with private student loans that KeyBank extended to plaintiffs. The court concluded that (1) the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., preempted the Broughton-Cruz rule and (2) the arbitration clause in the parties' contracts must be enforced because it was not unconscionable. Therefore, the court did not reach the question, presented in Appeal No. 10-15934, whether the NBA and the regulations of the OCC preempted plaintiffs' UCL claims. Accordingly, in Interlocutory Appeal No. 09-16703, the court reversed the district court's denial of KeyBank's motion to compel arbitration, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter an order staying the case and compelling arbitration. Because the disposition of that appeal rendered the district court's subsequent dismissal order a nullity, the court dismissed Appeal No. 10-15934 as moot. View "Kilgore, et al. v. Keybank, et al." on Justia Law

Borrower brought suit against a payday loan company (Company), arguing that its arbitration agreement containing a class waiver was unenforceable. The trial court found that Company's arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable because its class waiver deprived borrowers of a meaningful remedy. The Supreme Court reversed in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, holding that that the trial court erred in finding that Company's arbitration agreement was unconscionable based on its class waiver and should have instead adjudicated whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable in light of Borrower's evidence relevant to her claims regarding ordinary state-law principles that govern contracts but that do no single out or disfavor arbitration. Remanded. View "Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc." on Justia Law

Missouri Title Loans appealed from a judgment finding that a class arbitration waiver contained in its loan agreement, promissory note, and security agreement (agreement) was unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment insofar as it held that the arbitration waiver was unconscionable and reversed that part of the judgment ordering that the claim be submitted to an arbitrator to determine suitability for class arbitration, holding that the appropriate remedy was to strike the entire arbitration agreement. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Court's judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of AT&T Mobility, LLC. v. Concepcion. Applying Concepcion, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the presence and enforcement of the class arbitration waiver did not make the arbitration clause unconscionable; (2) the formation of the agreement was unconscionable; and (3) therefore, the appropriate remedy was revocation of the arbitration clause contained within the agreement. Remanded. View "Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc." on Justia Law