Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

A pipeline owner and a natural gas supplier entered into a contract for the transportation of the supplier's natural gas. The parties later became embroiled in a dispute and submitted their dispute to binding arbitration. After the arbitrators issued a decision largely favorable to the supplier, the pipeline owner sought to vacate the decision in the district court. The district court entered judgment in favor of the supplier. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration panel's decision to make the pipeline owner by for the lateral costs was not in manifest disregard of the law; and (2) the panel did not compromise on the matter of the destination-end heating costs, which it imposed on the supplier for the future but declined to make the ruling retroactive; and (3) even assuming that the arbitrators committed misconduct by considering in their decision two documents among the three that the panel attached to its written decision, the misconduct could not have been prejudicial. View "Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Servs. (U.S.) Inc." on Justia Law

Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. and Regions Bank (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Regions") appealed an order of the Baldwin Circuit Court which granted in part and denied in part their motions to compel arbitration in an action filed against them by Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC ("BCSS"). In 2001 BCSS began discussing with AmSouth Bank ("AmSouth"), the predecessor-in-interest to Regions Bank, options to finance its existing debt. AmSouth recommended that BCSS finance its debt through variable-rate demand notes ("VRDNs").1 In its complaint, BCSS alleged that in late 2008 it received a notice of a substantial increase in the variable interest rates on its 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007 VRDNs, which constituted BCSS's first notice that the interest-rate-swap agreements recommended by Regions did not fix the interest rate on the VRDNs but, instead, exposed BCSS to "an entirely new increased level of market risk in the highly complex derivative market." BCSS sued Regions Bank and Morgan Keegan asserting that Regions falsely represented to BCSS that swap agreements fixed BCSS's interest rates on all the BCSS debt that had been financed through the VRDNs. Following a hearing on the motions to compel arbitration, the trial court entered an order in which it granted the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the credit agreements but denied the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the failure of the swap transactions to provide a fixed interest rate. The trial court reasoned that the "Jurisdiction" clause in a master agreement, in combination with its merger clause, "prevent[ed] any argument that the VRDN arbitration agreement applies to disputes concerning the swap agreements" and that those clauses demonstrated that it was "the parties' intention, as it relates to the interest-swap agreement and any transaction related to that agreement, that the parties would not arbitrate but instead [any dispute] would be resolved by proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Regions presented evidence of the existence of a contract requiring arbitration of the disputes at issue. The Court reversed the order of the trial court denying the motions to compel arbitration of BCSS's claims concerning the master agreement and the swap agreement and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Regions Bank v. Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Respondent Ryan Enquist's petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in which that court affirmed the trial court's award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees to Petitioner Jeffery Niccum at a trial de novo following mandatory arbitration. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly subtracted statutory costs and attorney fees from Niccum's offer of compromise before determining that Enquist failed to improve his position for purposes of MAR 7.3. Upon review, the Court determined the appellate court's conclusion was in error, and reversed. View "Niccum v. Enquist" on Justia Law

Gott was a resident of Odin Healthcare where she died, on January 31, 2006. Her estate brought a survival action under the Nursing Home Care Act and the Wrongful Death Act, claiming that as a result of violations of the Nursing Home Care Act, Gott sustained gastrointestinal bleeding, anemia, and respiratory failure. The wrongful-death claim sought damages for injuries sustained by her heirs. Odin sought to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by Gott and by her “legal representative.” The trial court refused to compel arbitration, viewing the agreement as unenforceable for lack of mutuality and as contrary to public policy. The court held that the wrongful-death claim was not arbitrable and that the Federal Arbitration Act was inapplicable. On remand, the appellate court accepted applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act but still affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part. Arbitration can be compelled on Survival Act claims, alleging Nursing Home Care Act violations and seeking damages for injuries sustained by Gott while alive. However, the wrongful-death claim did not accrue until Gott died, and benefits obtained under it are payable to the next of kin rather than to her estate. No previously signed arbitration agreement is applicable to this claim. View "Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a judicial resolution of an LLC in which both Plaintiffs and Defendants held ownership interests. The district court ordered judicial dissolution and appointment of a receiver after finding that the managing member of the LLC, one of the defendants, had never operated the LLC in conformity with the operating agreement and had acted in a manner that was unduly prejudicial to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there were substantial undisputed facts to support the district court's order for dissolution under Mont. Code Ann. 35-8-902(1), and the district court properly applied the statute; and (2) the district court properly denied Defendants' motion to amend their answer to add counterclaims because Defendants were required to arbitrate such claims under the operating agreement. View "Gordon v. Kuzara" on Justia Law

Avaya Inc. ("Avaya") appealed a district court's ruling compelling arbitration of its labor dispute with the Communication Workers of America ("CWA") over the legal status of a class of Avaya employees called "backbone engineers." The union viewed the backbone engineers as non-represented "occupational" employees and legitimate objects for its organizing campaigns, while Avaya saw them as managers outside the scope of the company's labor agreements. CWA contended the parties' collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") required any dispute over the status of backbone engineers to be resolved in arbitration. Avaya maintained the parties did not consent to arbitrate the status of its backbone engineers and accused CWA of trying to unilaterally enlarge the CBA to encompass disputes over company management. Having reviewed the CBA and the evidence submitted to the district court, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Avaya's position and reversed the district court's order compelling arbitration. View "CWA v. Avaya, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal was rooted in a dispute over an arbitration award. Each party had selected an arbitrator, and a third neutral arbitrator was selected by the two party-appointed arbitrators. Appellee argued that the award should be vacated because one of the party-appointed arbitrators did not disclose that he was first cousins with one of the shareholders in the opposing counsel's law firm. The district court granted Appellee's motion to vacate arbitration award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under section 129 of the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act (UUAA), there is no appeal of right from a district court order denying confirmation of an arbitration award, vacating the award, and directing a rehearing; (2) party-appointed arbitrators are held to the disclosure standards of the UUAA and not the standards that apply to neutral arbitrators; and (3) the UUAA does not support vacatur in this case, as (i) under subsection 113(4) of the UUAA, the failure to disclose a relationship can support vacatur only if it also meets one of the provisions outlined in subsection 124(1)(b) of the UUAA; and (ii) none of those provisions was shown in this case. View "WestGate Resorts, Ltd. v. Adel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants on behalf of themselves and similarly situated plaintiffs, alleging, inter alia, that defendants engaged in unlawful, unfair, and deceptive practices through unauthorized enrollment practices known as "post transaction marketing" and "data pass." At issue was whether plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate their dispute with defendants as a consequence of an arbitration provision that defendants asserted was part of a contract between the parties. The court concluded that despite some limited availability of the arbitration provision to plaintiffs, they were not bound to arbitrate this dispute. In regards to the email at issue, under the contract law of Connecticut or California - either of which could apply to this dispute - the email did not provide sufficient notice to plaintiffs of the arbitration provision, and plaintiffs therefore could not have assented to it solely as a result of their failure to cancel their enrollment in defendants' service. In regards to the hyperlink at issue, the court concluded that defendants forfeited the argument that plaintiffs were on notice of the arbitration provision through the hyperlink by failing to raise it in the district court. View "Schnabel et al. v. Trilegiant Corp. et al." on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether an appellate court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court order confirming an arbitration award in part and vacating the award in part based on the existence of unresolved questions of law or fact necessary to a ruling, yet the trial court did not expressly direct a rehearing. The court of appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction over the appeal, holding (1) the judgment was not final because it did not contain finality language or otherwise state that it was a final judgment and necessarily contemplated resolution of the remaining issues by way of a rehearing, and therefore, the appeal was interlocutory; and (2) no statute permitted an appeal in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed and, for different reasons, dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding (1) the appeal was interlocutory; (2) the Texas Arbitration Act did not provide jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal; and (3) there is no jurisdiction over arbitration awards that are incomplete unless, under certain circumstances, the parties file a writ of mandamus, which neither party here filed. View "Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge" on Justia Law

The Union attempted to commence arbitration of a terminated employee's grievance. Before arbitration proceedings commenced, the employee died, and the employer refused to proceed with arbitration. The Union brought this suit to compel arbitration. The district court found that the employer did not agree to arbitrate claims of a deceased employee and dismissed the case. The court reversed and held that the parties agreed to mandatory arbitration of the employee's claim and no legal principal deprived the Union of power to enforce that agreement. View "Sheet Metal Workers, etc. v. Silgan Containers, etc." on Justia Law