Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

At issue in this certified appeal was whether Plaintiff, the city of New Britain, agreed to arbitrate a dispute with certain city employees, classified as foremen, regarding an alleged violation of the city's civil service rules. The trial court denied Plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award in favor of Defendant, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1186. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate the foremen's dispute in a settlement agreement between the parties. Because Plaintiff did not agree to arbitrate the dispute, it could not be compelled to submit to arbitration. Remanded with direction to grant Plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award. View "City of New Britain v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1186" on Justia Law

Appellants Michael and Analisa Jones purchased a home with a loan from a mortgage company, which assigned the note and deed of trust to SunTrust Mortgage. After the Joneses defaulted on their mortgage, the Joneses elected to participate in the Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) provided for in Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.086. SunTrust and the Joneses resolved the pending foreclosure by agreeing to a short sale of the Joneses' home. The Joneses, however, never returned the short-sale documents and instead filed a petition for judicial review in the district court, requesting that the court impose sanctions against SunTrust because SunTrust violated section 107.086 and foreclosure mediation rules (FMRs) by failing to provide required documents and mediating in bad faith. The district court (1) denied the petition, finding that the Joneses entered into an enforceable short-sale agreement and therefore waived any claims under section 107.086 and the FMRs; and (2) allowed SunTrust to seek a certificate from the FMP to proceed with the foreclosure based on the terms of the short-sale agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the short-sale agreement was an enforceable settlement agreement, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to impose sanctions against SunTrust. View "Jones v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from respondent's injury on the job and the arbitration agreement he signed as a condition of his employment. At issue was whether an appellate court had jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court order confirming an arbitration award in part and vacating the award in part based on the existence of unresolved questions of law or fact necessary to a ruling, yet the trial court did not expressly direct a rehearing. Because the order left significant factual and legal issues open for further determination, it was interlocutory and not appealable unless authorized by statute. Accordingly, the court of appeals and the court did not have jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. View "Bison Building Materials, Ltd., v. Aldridge" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the terms of an agreement between the plaintiff, AVCORR Management, and the defendant, Central Falls Detention Facility, required the Facility to arbitrate certain disputed fees. AVCORR petitioned the superior court to appoint a binding arbitrator to settle the parties' dispute concerning several types of fees that AVCORR claimed were owed to it by the Facility. The Facility argued that only some, but not all, of the fees were subject to binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement. The superior court granted AVCORR's petition. The Supreme Court vacated and reversed the order of the superior court to the extent that the order granted AVCORR's petition to appoint a binding arbitrator to resolve the parties' dispute regarding one particular fee, the Annual Man Day Fee, holding that the parties agreed not to submit to arbitration those disputes dealing with the Annual Man Day Fee. View "AVCORR Mgmt., LLC v. Cent. Falls Detention Facility Corp." on Justia Law

Arnold & Itkin, a Texas-based law firm, appealed from a judgment of the district court sanctioning it for its conduct in opposing the arbitration of a dispute between its clients. Arnold & Itkin challenged the determination that the conduct was sanctioned and the amount and form of the sanctions imposed. The court largely affirmed the judgment of the district court, except that the court remanded in part to permit the district court to consider whether it should impose certain limits on its requirements that Arnold & Itkin's attorneys attached the sanction order to all future applications for admission pro hac vice in the Southern District of New York. View "Prospect Capital Corp. v. Enmon" on Justia Law

By their 1998 Primary Care Physician Agreement, the parties agreed that Dr. Sutter would provide primary care health services to members of Oxford's managed care network in exchange for predetermined reimbursement. They agreed to arbitrate any disputes. A dispute arose when Sutter accused Oxford of improperly denying, underpaying, and delaying reimbursement of physicians' claims. Sutter filed a complaint on behalf of himself and a class of health care providers, alleging breach of contract and other violations of New Jersey law. The state court granted Oxford’s motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator determined that the agreement allowed for class arbitration. The arbitrator entered a Partial Final Class Determination Award. Oxford sought to vacate, arguing that the arbitrator disregarded the law by ordering class arbitration. The district court denied Oxford's motion and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Arbitration proceeded on a classwide basis. Oxford later moved to vacated, based on the 2010 Supreme Court decision, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. The arbitrator endeavored to interpret the parties' agreement within the bounds of the law and his interpretation was not irrational. Nothing more is required under the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans, L.L.C." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a claim for damages relating to a drilling contract Petitioner Elcon Construction and Respondent Eastern Washington University. Elcon alleged tort and contract claims. The contract claims were resolved by arbitration. In dismissing the tort claims, the trial court applied the independent duty rule formerly known as the "economic loss rule," which the Court of Appeals similarly applied in affirming. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court and Court of Appeals misapplied the independent duty doctrine to bar Elcon's tort claims in this case. The Court found Elcon's claims failed factually. Viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Elcon, no genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to Elcon's fraud in the inducement or tortious interference claims. The Court affirmed on different grounds reached by the trial and appeals courts. View "Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ." on Justia Law

In 1996, RG, exclusive licensee of a German patent and corresponding patents in the U.S., Europe, and Japan relating to genetic identification, entered into a license agreement with Promega, granting Promega certain licenses. The agreement included a clause, providing that “all controversies or disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or relating to the breach thereof, shall be resolved by arbitration” and prohibited assignment without consent. Assignments were approved in 2001 and 2003; a subsequent assignment from IP to LT was not approved. In 2008 LT believed that Promega was paying less than required royalties. Negotiations failed and LT demanded arbitration. Promega sought a declaratory judgment of non-arbitrability, alleging infringement of five patents and contenting that rights under the 1996 agreement had never been assigned to LT. IP then moved to compel arbitration. The district court ordered arbitration, finding that IP was the assignee, remained in existence, and that it was irrelevant that Promega alleged that IP was merely a puppet of LT. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Promega Corp. v. Life Tech. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against M&T Bank, alleging that it improperly charged its checking account customers overdraft fees. The district court denied M&T Bank's renewed motion to compel arbitration, finding that plaintiff's claims were not within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. The court held that, under the delegation provision, the decision of whether plaintiff's claims were within the scope of the arbitration agreement was a decision for an arbitrator, and the district court erred in making the decision itself. Further, the court believed that it was prudent for the district court to reconsider its unconscionability determination in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, so the court did not reach whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Given v. M&T Bank Corp, et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose from the same facts: in 1990, Richard L. Parker applied to American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus (Aflac) for a cancer-indemnity insurance policy. Aflac issued Parker a policy. The term of the 1990 policy was month-to-month; the monthly premium was $28.50. Aflac received payments for the 1990 policy from August 25, 1990, to August 17, 1996. Parker applied for a new policy in May 1996 for when the 1990 policy was set to terminate. The 1996 policy took effect August 16, 1996, and used the same number as the 1990 policy. Parker renewed the policy once again in 2009, but the 2009 policy contained an arbitration clause. By a special waiver, the 2009 policy's language stated that Parker would give up his "current" policy and its benefits for the benefits in the new one. Parker paid according to the term of the 2009 policy. But in 2010, Parker sued Aflac asserting a claim of bad faith for Aflac's alleged failing to pay policy benefits owed under the 1990 policy. Aflac responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration according to the terms of the 2009 policy. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion and denied it. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Aflac satisfied its burden of proving that an arbitration agreement existed that applied to Parker's claims against it. Because there was no issue as to whether the contract containing the arbitration agreement affected interstate commerce, the burden then shifted to Parker to offer evidence refuting the evidence offered by Aflac and Hunter; Parker offered no evidence to refute that evidence and presented "no persuasive argument" that Aflac failed to meet its burden. The Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v. Parker " on Justia Law