Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

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HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC transitioned a petroleum refinery into a renewable diesel production facility in 2021. During this transition, HollyFrontier reassigned work from hourly workers to salaried employees with higher education and technical expertise. The United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union Local 11-574 filed a grievance, alleging that this reassignment violated their collective bargaining agreement (CBA). An arbitrator ruled in favor of HollyFrontier on the reassignment issue but also decided that salaried employees should be included in the bargaining unit, an issue not submitted for arbitration.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming reviewed the case and granted HollyFrontier's petition to vacate the arbitrator's decision regarding the inclusion of salaried employees in the bargaining unit. The court reasoned that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding an issue that was not submitted for arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's vacatur of the arbitration award. The court held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by addressing an issue not submitted for arbitration. The parties had only submitted the issue of whether HollyFrontier's reassignment of work violated the CBA, and the arbitrator's decision to include salaried employees in the bargaining unit was beyond the scope of the submitted issue. The court emphasized that arbitration is limited to the issues the parties agree to submit, and the arbitrator must stay within those bounds. View "HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. United Steel Paper" on Justia Law

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Vermont Mutual Insurance Company issued a homeowners insurance policy to Joanne St. Vil for property in Rumford, Rhode Island. St. Vil filed a claim for windstorm damage, which Vermont Mutual paid after an inspection. St. Vil later engaged New England Property Services Group, LLC (NEPSG) for additional repairs, leading to a dispute over the scope of damages. St. Vil assigned her insurance claim to NEPSG, which demanded an appraisal. Vermont Mutual objected to NEPSG's appraiser, Steven Ceceri, due to his financial interest but proceeded with the appraisal, reserving the right to dispute the award. The appraisal resulted in a final award of $144,855.37, which Vermont Mutual contested.The Superior Court denied Vermont Mutual's petition to vacate the appraisal award and granted NEPSG's cross-petition to confirm it. The court ruled that the policy did not require the appraiser to be disinterested, referencing a similar case it had previously decided.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the appraisal process in Vermont Mutual's policy constituted arbitration under the Arbitration Act. The Court found that Steven Ceceri had a direct financial interest in the award, establishing evident partiality. The Court also determined a causal nexus between Ceceri's conduct and the final award, as the award was not unanimous and significantly higher than Vermont Mutual's appraiser's estimate. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for a new appraisal. View "Vermont Mutual Insurance Company v. New England Property Services Group, LLC" on Justia Law

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Trista Carter entered into a contract with Johnny Mack Morrow and Martha Morrow to purchase a house and 245 acres for $1,600,000. The contract included provisions for earnest money and an arbitration clause. The sale did not close, and the Morrows sued Carter for breach of contract and sought damages, including the earnest money. They also named Crye-Leike, Inc., the company holding the earnest money, as a defendant.The Franklin Circuit Court reviewed the case and denied Carter's motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the arbitration clause did not apply to disputes arising under paragraphs 11 and 12 of the contract, which included the earnest money dispute. Carter filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, arguing that the breach-of-contract claim was not solely an interpleader action regarding the earnest money. The trial court denied Carter's postjudgment motions by operation of law.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the arbitration agreement in the contract specifically excluded disputes related to the earnest money, as outlined in paragraph 12. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion to compel arbitration for the interpleader claim. However, the court found that the breach-of-contract claim, which sought damages beyond the earnest money, was subject to arbitration under the contract's arbitration clause. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision regarding the interpleader claim but reversed the decision regarding the breach-of-contract claim and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Carter v. Morrow" on Justia Law

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Haylee Hinton was injured in a car accident caused by another motorist running a red light. She initially sought compensation from her employer’s workers’ compensation insurer and later settled with the motorist’s insurance carrier. Hinton then filed a claim for underinsured motorist benefits with Midwest Family Mutual Insurance, her underinsured motorist coverage provider, and submitted the claim to arbitration as permitted by Utah law.Midwest sought a declaratory judgment from the district court to limit the categories of damages Hinton could recover in arbitration, citing Utah Code section 31A-22-305.3(4)(c)(i), which excludes benefits paid or payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act from underinsured motorist coverage. The district court interpreted the statute to mean that past and future medical expenses and two-thirds of lost wages were payable under workers’ compensation and ruled that Hinton could not recover these categories of damages from Midwest.Hinton petitioned for interlocutory review, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction and misinterpreted the statute. The Utah Supreme Court found that the district court had jurisdiction but misinterpreted the statute. The court concluded that “payable” means benefits that can or may be paid to a specific claimant in a particular case, not just categories of damages generally available under workers’ compensation. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings to determine what benefits remain payable to Hinton under the Workers’ Compensation Act. View "Hinton v. Midwest Family Mutual Insurance" on Justia Law

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Irma Jordan filed a negligence complaint against Esmerelda Macedo in the circuit court of Cook County following a car accident. The case was referred to mandatory arbitration, where the arbitrator awarded Jordan $13,070. Neither party rejected the award, and Jordan submitted it to the circuit court for judgment. Jordan then filed a motion seeking prejudgment interest and statutory costs, which the circuit court denied, stating the arbitration award included the full amount to be reduced to judgment.The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's denial of statutory costs but reversed the denial of prejudgment interest. The appellate court held that Jordan should have requested costs during arbitration, referencing the Cruz v. Northwestern Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc. decision. However, it agreed that prejudgment interest could be requested in the circuit court as it is not considered damages.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and held that, according to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 92(e), statutory costs can be sought during arbitration, but failure to do so does not waive the right to seek them in the trial court upon entry of judgment. The court found that Rule 92(e) allows for statutory costs to be requested in the trial court even if not addressed by the arbitrator. The court reversed the appellate court's judgment regarding statutory costs and affirmed the judgment regarding prejudgment interest. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Jordan v. Macedo" on Justia Law

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Fu Jing Wu and Wai Lam set up investment funds for foreign investors, promising opportunities to immigrate to the United States through the EB-5 visa program. They fraudulently diverted millions of dollars from these funds. An investor, Chun Liu, sued them in a Florida court. Wu and Lam removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration based on a purchase agreement. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed the case. The court found that Wu was not a signatory to the purchase agreement containing the arbitration clause and thus could not enforce it. Consequently, the court ruled that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act and remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) barred appellate review of the district court's order that both denied the motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the denial of the motion to compel arbitration was intrinsic to the jurisdictional decision and could not be reviewed separately. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Wu and Lam’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wu v. Liu" on Justia Law

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Connie Lange purchased a fifth-wheel camping trailer from GMT Auto Sales in August 2020, which included a $199 administrative fee. Lange later filed a class action petition alleging that GMT violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act by charging this fee, arguing that fifth-wheel camping trailers do not qualify as "motor vehicles," "vessels," or "vessel trailers" under the relevant statute. GMT initially moved to dismiss the case but later moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the retail installment contract.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County overruled GMT's motion to dismiss and later granted GMT's motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Lange $199 and $5,000 in attorney fees. Lange then filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award and reconsider the order compelling arbitration, which the circuit court denied. Lange appealed, arguing that GMT waived its right to arbitration by filing the motion to dismiss and that the arbitration provision was unenforceable.The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment, agreeing with Lange that GMT waived its right to arbitration. The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer and reviewed the case de novo. The court found that GMT did not waive its right to arbitration by filing the motion to dismiss, as it timely moved to compel arbitration and raised it as an affirmative defense in its responsive pleading. The court also found that the arbitration provision remained enforceable despite the assignment of the retail installment contract to a bank. Lange's argument regarding the unconscionability of the arbitration provision was deemed unpreserved for review.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment confirming the arbitration award. View "Lange v. GMT Auto Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

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A catastrophic turbine failure occurred at the Hadjret En Nouss Power Plant in Tipaza, Algeria. The plant is owned by Shariket Kahraba Hadjret En Nouss (SKH), which is jointly owned by the Algerian government and Algerian Utilities International Ltd. SNC-Lavalin Contructeurs International Inc. (SNC) operated the plant on behalf of SKH. SNC entered into multiple contracts with various General Electric entities, including a Services Contract with General Electric International, which contained an arbitration clause.The insurers, reinsurers, and retrocessionaires (collectively the "Insurers") initiated litigation as subrogees of SKH against General Electric International, General Electric Company, GE Power, and GE Power Services Engineering (collectively the "GE Entities") in Georgia's state-wide business court. The GE Entities removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the Services Contract. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted the motion, concluding that SKH was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that SKH, as the plant's owner, was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract. Consequently, the Insurers, as subrogees of SKH, were bound by the arbitration clause. The court also affirmed that any questions regarding the arbitrability of specific claims should be resolved by the arbitrator, as the Services Contract incorporated the Conciliation and Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, which delegate such decisions to the arbitrator. View "Various Insurers, Reinsurers and Retrocessionaires v. General Electric International, Inc." on Justia Law

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A collective bargaining agreement between the Teamsters Union and Quality Custom Distribution guaranteed that the top 80% of senior employees would receive at least 40 paid hours per week. During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, many Starbucks stores in or near Chicago closed or reduced their hours, resulting in senior employees averaging only 30 hours a week. The Union demanded that the employer make up the difference, but the employer refused, citing an exception for Acts of God.The dispute was taken to an arbitrator, who ruled in favor of the Union. The arbitrator determined that while epidemics might be considered Acts of God, the reduction in work was primarily due to the Governor of Illinois' orders, which were not Acts of God. The employer then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to nullify the arbitrator's decision. The district court judge declined to nullify the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that as long as the arbitrator interprets the contract, the award must stand. The arbitrator had interpreted the contract's "Act of God" clause, concluding it did not cover the Governor's orders. The court emphasized that judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to ensuring the arbitrator interpreted the contract, not whether the interpretation was correct. The court also noted that the employer's conduct in the litigation process imposed unnecessary costs and ordered the employer to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. View "Quality Custom Distribution Services LLC v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 710" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, representing a putative class, filed an antitrust lawsuit against Grubhub Inc., Postmates Inc., and Uber Technologies, Inc. (collectively, "Defendants"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and its state analogues by entering into no-price competition clauses (NPCCs) with restaurants, which prevented the restaurants from offering lower prices through other channels. The plaintiffs claimed that these NPCCs led to artificially high prices for restaurant meals. The class included customers who purchased takeout or delivery directly from restaurants subject to NPCCs, customers who dined in at such restaurants, and customers who used non-defendant platforms to purchase from these restaurants.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the scope of the arbitration clauses was an issue for the court to decide and that the clauses did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims as they lacked a nexus to the defendants' Terms of Use. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not agreed to Grubhub's Terms of Use.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision in part, ruling that the question of arbitrability for the plaintiffs' claims against Grubhub is for the court to decide and that Grubhub's arbitration clause does not apply to the plaintiffs' antitrust claims. However, the court reversed the district court's decision in part, finding that Grubhub had established an agreement to arbitrate with the plaintiffs and that the threshold question for the plaintiffs' claims against Uber and Postmates is for the arbitrator to decide. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Davitashvili v. Grubhub" on Justia Law