Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff B. A. Tyler filed suit against David Findling; the Findling Law Firm, PLC; and Mekel Miller, alleging that David Findling published defamatory statements to attorney Anna Wright by telling her that plaintiff and plaintiff’s client (Samir Warda, for whose estate Findling had been appointed as a receiver) might have engaged in inappropriate or illegal activities. Findling made the allegedly defamatory statements to Wright, Warda’s attorney in a personal protection insurance (PIP) lawsuit, who recorded the conversation, in a room reserved for the plaintiffs’ side at the outset of a court-ordered mediation in the PIP matter. Wright subsequently shared this recording with plaintiff. Findling and his law firm (collectively, “defendants”) moved for summary judgment, and plaintiff responded with an affidavit by Wright. Defendants moved to strike Wright’s affidavit and to preclude her testimony at trial. The trial court granted the motion to strike under MCL 2.412(C), which governed the confidentiality of mediation communications, and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion to file an amended complaint was also denied. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to strike Wright’s affidavit and find her testimony inadmissible, reversed the order granting defendants summary judgment, affirmed the order denying plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, finding Findling's statements were indeed "mediation communications" under MCR 2.412(B)(2) and were therefore confidential under MCR 2.412(C). The Supreme Court also determined the appeals court erred in reversing the grant of summary judgment without which, plaintiff had no evidence to support the relevant defamation allegations. In all other respects, the appellate court's judgment was affirmed. View "Tyler v. Finding" on Justia Law

Southard worked for Newcomb, then filed a putative class action, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, plus state-law claims. Newcomb removed the case to federal court. Southard amended his complaint to delete the FLSA claim. Newcomb moved to dismiss Southard’s complaint or to stay the action pending arbitration. The district court concluded that the parties did not form an agreement to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 3-4 and denied Newcomb’s motion, then remanded Southard’s remaining state-law claims to state court.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. To invoke FAA remedies, the parties must have entered into a “written agreement for arbitration.” Courts evaluate whether an agreement qualifies as FAA arbitration based on the common features of classic arbitration: a final, binding remedy by a third party, an independent adjudicator, substantive standards, and an opportunity for each side to present its case. Southard’s application for employment states: I accept that any complaint or conflict that cannot be resolved internally may be referred to Alternative Dispute Resolution unless prohibited by law, before any other legal action is taken. The employee handbook states the employee agrees "to Alternative Dispute Resolution a forum or means for resolving disputes, as arbitration or mediation, that exists outside the state or federal judicial system, unless prohibited by law," and If there is a conflict that cannot be resolved, "both agree that the matter will be referred to mediation.”. The parties agreed to alternative dispute resolution generally, not arbitration specifically. View "Southard v. Newcomb Oil Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Union and AT&T entered into a contract governing certification of the Union to represent non-management employees and the relationship between the parties, requiring the parties to arbitrate disputes over “the description of an appropriate unit for bargaining” and the definition of “nonmanagement” employees. All other disputes arising under the contract “shall not be subject to arbitration.” Disputes that are subject to arbitration must “be submitted to arbitration administered by, and in accordance with, the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).” The AAA’s Labor Arbitration Rules provide that the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his own jurisdiction, “including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.” After AT&T acquired Time Warner, the Union initiated discussions about “appropriate potential bargaining units in the newly acquired company.” The parties could not reach an agreement. The Union sought to compel arbitration. The district court dismissed, finding the dispute did not lie within the categories of arbitrable disputes, and that it (as opposed to the arbitrator) could make that threshold determination.The D.C. Circuit vacated. The agreement delegates threshold questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator. The question of whether the parties’ dispute falls within the contract’s arbitration clause, then, is for an arbitrator, not a court, to decide. The district court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the dispute must be submitted to arbitration. View "Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. AT&T Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration in a putative class action brought by Massachusetts residents who have worked as Uber drivers, seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting Uber from classifying drivers in Massachusetts as independent contractors, as well as an order directing Uber to classify its drivers as employees and comply with Massachusetts wage laws.The panel concluded that Uber drivers, as a nationwide class of workers, do not fall within the so-called "interstate commerce" exemption to mandatory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The panel explained that Uber drivers, even when crossing state lines or transporting passengers to airports, are merely conveying interstate passengers between their homes and their destination in the normal course of their independent local service. Therefore, interstate movement cannot be said to be a central part of the class members' job description. The panel found the analysis of the minority of district courts that have found to the contrary unpersuasive.The panel also concluded that plaintiffs' claims and requested injunctive relief are arbitrable by the terms of the arbitration agreement and plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief would have upended the status quo rather than maintained it. Therefore, the district court properly addressed the motion to compel arbitration first.Finally, the panel concluded that the injunctive relief requested, reclassification of drivers' status from "independent contractors" to "employees" is not a public injunctive relief that may be allowed to them to avoid arbitration. In this case, the relief sought by plaintiffs is overwhelmingly directed at plaintiffs and other rideshare drivers, and they would be the primary beneficiaries of access to overtime and minimum wage laws. View "Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Code of Civil Procedure section 1288 requires that a petition to vacate an arbitration award must be filed and served no later than 100 days after service of the award. Section 1288.2 imposes the same deadline on a response to a petition to confirm an arbitration award when the response requests that the award be vacated. These deadlines are jurisdictional.The Court of Appeal did not reach the substantive issue because it agreed with LFG that defendant did not timely request that the arbitration award be vacated. The court concluded that neither defendant's petition to vacate the arbitration award nor her request to vacate the award in her response to LFG's petition to confirm were filed within the 100-day limit. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's request and the arbitration award must be confirmed. View "Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key" on Justia Law

Meinders offers chiropractic services. United provides or administers insurance plans nationwide. In 2006, Meinders became a “participating provider” with United to expand his customer base; he signed a provider agreement with ACN. which provided administrative and network management services for chiropractors, and had a preexisting master services agreement with United. The agreement allowed ACN, “in its sole discretion,” to “assign its rights, duties or obligations” under the agreement.“ The agreement stated that if a dispute arose, either party “may” submit the issue “to arbitration” and any arbitration decision would be “final and binding.”Meinders submitted claims for United-insured patients directly to United; United paid those claims. Those claims were submitted on United forms and if an explanation of benefits was requested, United provided it. Meinders confirmed a patient’s eligibility either through United’s website or through a United phone number. ACN became a wholly-owned subsidiary of United.In 2013, United sent a fax to Meinders, who believed that United had violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and filed suit. After remands, the district court held that “United … assumed the material obligations of ACN …, a wholly-owned subsidiary of United, under the Provider Agreement, which authorizes United to enforce the arbitration clause.” The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Dr. Robert L. Meinders, D.C., Ltd. v. United HealthCare Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Anonymous plaintiffs filed a putative class action against The Trump Corporation, Donald J. Trump, and various members of his family, asserting claims for racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), conspiracy to conduct the affairs of a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), dissemination of untrue and misleading public statements in violation of California law, unfair competition in violation of California law, unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of Maryland and Pennsylvania law, common-law fraud, and common-law negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs contend that defendants fraudulently induced them to enter into business relationships with non-party appellant, ACN, by making a series of deceptive and misleading statements. The district court denied both defendants and ACN's motions to compel arbitration.The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that (1) defendants may not compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their dispute on equitable estoppel grounds; and (2) the district court may not compel arbitration as to ACN's discovery dispute because the court lacked an independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties' dispute. The court considered defendants and ACN's remaining arguments on appeal and concluded that they are without merit. View "Doe v. The Trump Corporation" on Justia Law

After completing MoneyGram's Transfer Send Form, Fisher, a 63-year-old veteran with poor eyesight, initiated Moneygram money transfers at California Walmart stores, one for $2,000 to a Georgia recipient, and another for $1,530 to a Baton Rouge recipient. The funds were delivered to the intended recipients. Fisher never turned over the Send Form to read the Terms and Conditions, which included an arbitration requirement. He would have been unable to read the six-point print without a magnifying glass. Fisher sued MoneyGram, claiming that the transfers were induced by a “scammer,” and that MoneyGram knew its system was used by scammers but failed to warn or protect customers; MoneyGram’s service was used frequently in fraudulent transactions because the money was immediately available at a Walmart store or other MoneyGram outlet. Other services (bank transfers) place a temporary hold on funds to discourage fraudulent transactions. Fisher alleged MoneyGram had been the subject of an FTC injunction, requiring it to maintain a program to protect its consumers.Fisher’s class action complaint cited the unfair competition law. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of MoneyGram’s petition to compel arbitration. The provision was unenforceable as procedurally and substantively unconscionable, and not severable. The small font, placement, and “take it or leave it nature” were “indications” of procedural unconscionability. The one-year limitations period, a requirement that any plaintiff pay arbitration costs and fees, and waiver of attorneys’ fees were substantively unconscionable “in the aggregate.” View "Fisher v. MoneyGram International, Inc." on Justia Law

The primary issue in consolidated appeals was the scope of an automobile insurance policy’s arbitration provision. Two insureds with identical Allstate Insurance Company medical payments and uninsured/underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance coverage settled with their respective at-fault drivers for applicable liability insurance policy limits and then made medical payments and UIM benefits claims to Allstate. Allstate and the insureds were unable to resolve the UIM claims and went to arbitration as the policy required. The arbitration panels initially answered specific questions submitted about the insureds’ accident-related damages. At the insureds’ requests but over Allstate’s objections, the panels later calculated what the panels believed Allstate ultimately owed the insureds under their medical payments and UIM coverages and issued final awards. Allstate filed superior court suits to confirm the initial damages calculations, reject the final awards as outside the arbitration panels’ authority, and have the court determine the total amounts payable to the insureds under their policies. The judge assigned to both suits affirmed the final arbitration awards; Allstate appealed both decisions. The Alaska Supreme Court determined the arbitration panels had no authority to determine anything beyond the insureds’ damages arising from their accidents and because Allstate withheld its consent for the panels to determine anything else, the Court reversed the superior court’s decisions and judgments. The Supreme Court also reversed some aspects of the superior court’s separate analysis and rulings on legal issues that the panels improperly decided. Given (1) the arbitration panels’ damages calculations and (2) the Supreme Court's clarification of legal issues presented, the cases were remanded for the superior court to determine the amount, if any, Allstate had to pay each insured under their medical payments and UIM coverages. View "Allstate Insurance Company v. Harbour" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs DDK Hotels, DDK Hospitality, and DDK Management filed suit against Defendants Williams-Sonoma and West Elm, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. West Elm then brought an action in the Delaware Court of Chancery, seeking to dissolve the joint venture, which the Delaware court dismissed. Plaintiffs then filed a supplemental complaint in the district court to assert an additional claim for breach of the prevailing party provisions of Section 21(h) of the joint venture agreement. Defendants then moved to compel arbitration for that claim, which the district court denied.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying defendants' motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the joint venture agreement does not "clearly and unmistakably" delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator and that the district court therefore correctly ruled on the scope of the arbitration agreement. Finally, the court rejected DDK Hospitality's request for prevailing party fees and noted that DDK Hospitality may pursue its request for fees on remand. View "DDK Hotels, LLC v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc." on Justia Law