Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that the confirmation of an arbitration award had been issued prematurely, holding that although Ohio Rev. Code 2711.13 imposes a three-month deadline for motions to vacate, modify, or correct arbitration awards, that period is a maximum time that is not guaranteed.At issue was whether section 2711.13 requires a trial court to wait three months before confirming an arbitration award when the party opposing confirmation informs the trial court that it intends to file a motion to vacate, modify, or correct under section 2711.10 or 2711.11. The Supreme Court held that section 2711.13 does not operate as an automatic stay on confirmation of an arbitration award but, rather, requires parties opposed to the confirmation to be diligent in seeking to vacate, modify, or correct it. View "BST Ohio Corp. v. Wolgang" on Justia Law

At issue in this labor dispute case is who decides whether the arbitrator was validly (i.e., mutually rather than unilaterally) appointed: the challenged arbitrator himself, or instead a court. The district court concluded that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) assigns to the arbitrator himself the authority to determine the validity of his own appointment.The DC Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for the district court to determine whether the challenged arbitrator was validly appointed. The court concluded that the dispute over the arbitrator's appointment involves the kind of question that is presumptively for judicial rather than arbitral resolution. The court also concluded that the parties' CBA does not overcome this presumption through a clear and unmistakable assignment of power to the challenged arbitrator himself to decide the validity of his own appointment. View "District No. 1, Pacific Coast District, Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n v. Liberty Maritime Corp." on Justia Law

Pillar hired Epiphyte to convert its cryptocurrency into Euros. Epiphyte informed Pillar that it used Payward’s online exchange to convert its clients’ cryptocurrencies. Pillar transferred its cryptocurrency into Epiphyte’s account on Payward’s platform. After Epiphyte converted the currency but before the exchanged funds were transferred to Pillar’s bank account, four million Euros belonging to Pillar were stolen from Epiphyte’s account.Pillar sued Payward, alleging Payward knew or should have known that Epiphyte was using its Payward account on Pillar's behalf, failed to use standard security measures that would have prevented the theft, and falsely advertised that it provided the best security in the business. Payward moved to compel arbitration, claiming that Epiphyte agreed to Payward’s “Terms of Service” when it created an account, as required for all users, that those Terms included an arbitration agreement, and that Pillar was bound by that agreement.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Payward’s motion. There is no evidence Epiphyte was acting as Pillar’s agent when it agreed to the Terms two years before Pillar hired it or that the agency relationship automatically bound the principal to the agent’s prior acts. There is no evidence Pillar knew the arbitration agreements existed or had a right to rescind them. No ratification occurred. There was no intent to benefit Pillar or similar parties. Pillar’s claims are not inextricably intertwined with the Terms. View "Pillar Project AG v. Payward Ventures, Inc." on Justia Law

Bannister worked in the administrative offices at a skilled nursing facility, for approximately three decades before Marinidence purchased the facility. A year later, Marinidence terminated Bannister. She sued, alleging discrimination, retaliation, and defamation. Marinidence moved to compel arbitration, alleging that, when it took over the facility, Bannister electronically signed an arbitration agreement while completing the paperwork for new Marinidence employees. After Bannister presented evidence that she never saw the agreement during the onboarding process, the trial court denied the motion.The court of appeal affirmed. Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent’s signature. Where, as here, the respondent challenges the validity of the signature, the petitioner must “establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the signature was authentic.” The court noted conflicting evidence, including Bannister’s evidence that she was not the only person who could have executed the arbitration agreement and the onboarding process was completed for other employees without their participation. View "Banister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's request for attorney's fees in this appeal arising from a grievance arbitration, holding that the State "incurred" attorney's fees for the purposes of Haw. Rev. Stat. 658A-25.In the arbitration, the State was represented by an attorney employed by the State's Department of Attorney General. The union requested attorney's fees and costs, which the circuit court denied. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Thereafter, the State filed a request for appellate attorney's fees and costs, citing section 658A-25 and Haw. R. App. P. 39(a). The ICA granted the State's request for costs but denied its request for attorney's fees on the grounds that the State "failed to demonstrate that it incurred, as an expense, liability, or legal obligation to pay, appellate attorney's fees[.]" The Supreme Court reversed and granted the State's request for attorney's fees, holding that the fees were erroneously denied on the grounds that they were not "incurred." View "In re Arbitration between United Public Workers and State" on Justia Law

Franklin, a nurse, was employed by a staffing agency, USSI, and had signed an Arbitration Agreement. USSI assigned Franklin to work at the Hospital. Franklin signed a Travel Nurse Assignment Contract that also includes an arbitration provision. The Hospital is not a signatory to either the Arbitration Agreement or the Assignment Contract. There is no contract between Franklin and the Hospital nor between the Hospital and USSI. The Hospital contracts with RightSourcing, which contracts with USSI to provide the contingent nursing staff. The Hospital retains supervision over the provision of clinical services. RightSourcing bills the Hospital and remits payment to USSI.Franklin brought a class and collective action against the Hospital, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the California Labor Code, and the California Business and Professions Code, alleging that the Hospital required Franklin to work during meal breaks and off the clock but failed to pay her for that work and failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements or reimburse travel expenses.The district court granted the Hospital’s motion to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Hospital, a nonsignatory, could compel arbitration because Franklin’s claims were intimately founded in and intertwined with her contracts with USSI; under California law, she was equitably estopped from avoiding the arbitration provisions. View "Franklin v. Community Regional Medical Center, FKA" on Justia Law

Stafford used his third-party insurance coverage to purchase prescription drugs from Rite Aid’s pharmacies. Rite Aid submits a claim for a prescription drug to an insurance company through a “pharmacy benefits manager” (PBM). The claim form that Rite Aid submits includes the “usual and customary” price of the relevant prescription drug.Stafford brought a class action, alleging that Rite Aid fraudulently inflated the reported prices of prescription drugs, which resulted in class members paying Rite Aid a higher co-payment for the drugs than they would have paid if Rite Aid had reported the correct price. After litigating several motions to dismiss, Rite Aid moved to compel arbitration. Although Rite Aid and Stafford had no contract between them containing an arbitration clause, Rite Aid did have such contracts with the PBMs who coordinated insurance reimbursements and co-payment calculations.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. Under California law, Stafford’s claims did not depend on Rite Aid’s contractual obligations to the PBMs. Consequently, equitable estoppel did not apply to bind Stafford to the arbitration agreements in those contracts. View "Stafford v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law

Foremost provided insurance for McIsaac's motorcycle. The uninsured motorist coverage endorsement included an arbitration provision. McIsaac was involved in an accident. The other driver’s insurance policy provided $15,000 of coverage. McIsaac’s policy provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage of up to $100,000 per person per accident. McIsaac initiated an uninsured motorist claim. Foremost opened an investigation and sent a settlement offer. McIsaac served Foremost with an arbitration demand. Foremost suggested proceeding with discovery and sent McIsaac interrogatories and a deposition notice.Months later, McIsaac filed suit, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and bad faith. Foremost filed a petition to compel arbitration. McIsaac argued his dispute was not solely about damages, but whether Foremost breached the contract and acted in bad faith. Foremost argued arbitration was a “condition precedent” to McIsaac’s lawsuit. The trial court denied the petition, stating that arbitration does not apply to claims of bad faith by the insurer.The court of appeal reversed. Under Insurance Code section 11580.2(f), disputes between insureds and insurers over entitlement to recover damages caused by an uninsured or underinsured motorist, or the amount of damages, must be resolved by agreement or arbitration. Foremost made a showing that the parties dispute the amount of damages. View "McIsaac v. Foremost Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Off-Spec Solutions LLC was a trucking company located in Nampa, Idaho, that was formed by two brothers: Christopher and Daniel Salvador. The Salvadors sold 51 percent of their ownership interest in Off-Spec Solutions to Transportation Investors LLC. To implement the transaction, the Salvadors and Transportation Investors entered into a purchase agreement and an LLC agreement. The purchase agreement identified “The Central Valley Fund II” and “The Central Valley Fund III” as affiliates of Transportation Investors. Off-Spec Solutions also entered into separate employment agreements with the Salvadors. The purchase agreement stated that all disputes concerning the agreement would be governed by California law. After disputes arose between the parties, Off-Spec Solutions petitioned an Idaho district court to compel the Salvadors to arbitrate claims relating to the employment agreements in Idaho instead of California. The Salvadors subsequently filed a cross-application with the district court seeking to compel Off-Spec Solutions and Transportation Investors and its affiliates to arbitrate all claims between the parties in a consolidated arbitration in Idaho. While those applications were pending, Transportation Investors and its affiliates filed a petition with a California Superior Court seeking to compel the Salvadors to arbitrate all claims arising from the purchase agreement and the LLC agreement in Sacramento County, California. The questions this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court’s review were: (1) whether a forum selection clause was unenforceable under California law if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum where suit is brought (in this case, Idaho); and, if yes, then (2) whether the forum selection clauses at issue must be invalidated based on the public policy set forth in Idaho Code section 29-110(1). The Supreme Court held California law required an examination of the public policy of the forum in which suit was brought, and that the forum selection clauses at issue violated the strong public policy of the State of Idaho. The Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that claims arising from the parties’ purchase agreement and LLC agreement had to be arbitrated in Idaho. View "Off-Spec Solutions LLC v. Transportation Investors LLC" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this first impression issue of whether the right to compel arbitration was waived when it is not raised as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading. Plaintiffs-appellees filed suit alleging various claims stemming from the parties' investment relationships. Nearly seventeen months after they filed their answer in which they omitted arbitration as an affirmative defense, defendants-appellants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties' agreements. Very little case activity involving defendants had taken place during that time. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to compel, holding that defendants-appellants waived any right to arbitration by failing to raise it in their answer. The Supreme Court held the right to compel arbitration was not waived in this case: defendants-appellants' motion to compel arbitration met the statutory requirements of the OUAA. “This finding, however, did not end our analysis because Oklahoma law provides that a party may waive their right to arbitration even when properly requested. After conducting an examination of the pertinent facts herein, we conclude Plaintiffs/Appellees failed to satisfy their burden of proof on the issue of waiver of the right to arbitration.” Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed. View "Howell's Well Service v. Focus Group Advisors" on Justia Law