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Moon performed at the Breathless Men’s Club in Rahway. She rented performance space in the Club and signed an Independent Dancer Rental Agreement, stating: Dancer understands and agrees that he/she is an independent contractor and not an employee of club. Dancer is renting the performance space for an agreed upon fee previously agreed to by Dancer and Club. … In a dispute between Dancer and Club under this Agreement, either may request to resolve the dispute by binding arbitration. THIS MEANS THAT NEITHER PARTY SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE SUCH CLAIM IN COURT OR TO HAVE A JURY TRIAL – DISCOVERY AND APPEAL RIGHTS ARE LIMITED IN ARBITRATION. ARBITRATION MUST BE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS. THIS MEANS NEITHER YOU NOR WE MAY JOIN OR CONSOLIDATE CLAIMS IN ARBITRATION, OR LITIGATE IN COURT OR ARBITRATE ANY CLAIMS AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF A CLASS. Moon sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201; the New Jersey Wage Payment Law; and the state Wage and Hour Law. The district court denied a motion to dismiss and ordered limited discovery on the arbitration issue. After discovery, the court granted the Club summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed. Moon’s claims do not arise out of the contract itself; the arbitration clause does not cover Moon’s statutory wage-and-hour claims. View "Moon v. Breathless Inc" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that Uber engaged in illegal price fixing. After the district court denied Uber's motion to compel arbitration, holding that plaintiff did not have reasonably conspicuous notice of and did not unambiguously manifest assent to Uber's Terms of Service when he registered. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, holding that the Uber App provided reasonably conspicuous notice of the Terms of Service as a matter of California law, and plaintiff's assent to arbitration was unambiguous in light of the objectively reasonable notice of the terms. The court remanded to the district court to consider whether defendants have waived their rights to arbitration and for any further proceedings. View "Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court vacating an arbitration award setting the amount of an insured loss caused by a tree falling on the insured home. After her property suffered a casualty loss, Plaintiff filed a claim under the policy insuring her property. The parties’ adjusters were unable to agree on the amount of the loss, and Plaintiff invoked the policy’s appraisal provision., which provided that the award was not conditioned on judicial review. After the appraisal panel issued its arbitration award Plaintiff filed an application with the superior court seeking to vacate the award. The trial court granted the application to vacate on the grounds that it violated Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-418. The Supreme Court held that the trial court improperly vacated the arbitration award because the arbitrators did not violate section 52-418. View "Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co." on Justia Law

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FFC and Global appealed the arbitrator's award after Global filed suit against FFC to recover amounts owed on unpaid invoices. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court prejudicially erred when it failed to apply the correct standards in reviewing the arbitrator's award; substantial evidence did not support the award and an alleged contract to be performed over a three-year period violated the statute of frauds; the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding a claim that FFC had not agreed to arbitrate; the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he added the Affiliates as obligors under the award; and the court deemed the appeals from the orders denying attorney fees as petitions for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its orders and to deny the motions. View "Harshad & Nasir Corp. v. Global Sign Systems" on Justia Law

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In 2015, Swain was fired from his job with Hermès managing the company’s New Jersey boutique at the Mall at Short Hills. Swain, a New Jersey resident, sued Hermès in New Jersey state court, asserting claims under New Jersey state law for discrimination and hostile work environment on the basis of sexual orientation, retaliation, and breach of contract. Swain named Hermès, and Bautista, who worked with Swain at the Short Hills Hermès store, as defendants. Asserting federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, Hermès filed a petition in federal district court to compel arbitration under Federal Arbitration Act section 4, naming Swain as the only respondent and citing a dispute resolution protocol that he had allegedly signed. The Second Circuit affirmed, in favor of Hermès. Swain did not contest the arbitrability of his dispute or that Swain and Hermès were citizens of different states. The court rejected Swain’s argument that it should “look through” the petition to the underlying dispute, as defined in Swain’s New Jersey lawsuit, and conclude that complete diversity is lacking because Swain and Bautista, who is adverse to Swain in his state court litigation in New Jersey, are both citizens of that state. View "Hermès of Paris, Inc. v. Swain" on Justia Law

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The Fourth Circuit held that the district court correctly denied Applied Underwriters' motion to compel arbitration in a suit alleging that Applied Underwriters engaged in the business of insurance in Virginia without complying with Virginia insurance and workers' compensation laws. However, the court held that the district court reversibly erred in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel to hold that the agreement between Applied Underwriters and plaintiff constituted an insurance contract for purposes of Virginia law. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Minnieland Private Day School v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co." on Justia Law

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Adrienne Scott purchased from Jack Ingram Motors, Inc. ("Jack Ingram"), a new 2015 Nissan Juke automobile, which had been manufactured by Nissan. Scott took the vehicle to Jack Ingram after smelling fuel in the interior of the vehicle. Jack Ingram did not detect the smell; it inspected the fuel system of the vehicle, and found no leaks in the fuel system. Two days later, while Scott was driving the vehicle, it spontaneously caught fire. Scott sued Jack Ingram and Nissan, raising a number of claims stemming from the fire. Jack Ingram moved to compel arbitration of the claims filed against it based on the arbitration agreement Scott had signed in connection with the sale of the vehicle. Scott filed a response indicating that, although she was willing to arbitrate her breach-of-warranty and negligence claims against Jack Ingram, she objected to litigating part of the case, i.e., her claims against Nissan. Scott She indicated in her response that she was willing to arbitrate the case or to litigate the case, but she objected to having to do both. The trial court entered an order holding that, "in the interest of judicial economy," the entire matter should be arbitrated. Nissan filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion by compelling Nissan to arbitrate the claims asserted against it by Scott. The trial court's order was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Nissan North America, Inc. v. Scott" on Justia Law

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Daphne Automotive, LLC, and its employee, Robin Sanders appealed a circuit court order denying their motion to compel arbitration of the claims filed against them by Eastern Shore Neurology Clinic, Inc. ("Eastern Shore"), and Rassan Tarabein. Tarabein owned Eastern Shore and another company, Infotec, Inc. Tarabein hired his nephew, Mohamad Tarbin, as an employee of Infotec. As part of the nephew's compensation, Tarabein agreed to provide him with the use of a vehicle for as long as he was employed with Infotec. Accordingly, Tarabein purchased, through Eastern Shore, a vehicle from Daphne Automotive. Tarabein, the nephew, and the dealership agreed that the dealership would arrange for the vehicle to be titled in the nephew's name, but that Eastern Shore would be listed on the title as lienholder. In conjunction with the sale, the nephew signed the sales contract, which contained an arbitration clause. Tarabein executed only the documents to establish Eastern Shore as lienholder on the title for the vehicle. In January 2014, the Department of Revenue issued an original certificate of title for the vehicle that listed no lienholders to the nephew. A few months later, the nephew was terminated from his job with Infotec, and Tarabein attempted to take back the vehicle, but the nephew refused. According to Tarabein, the dealership never informed him that it had failed to list Eastern Shore as a lienholder on the application for the certificate of title. As a result, the nephew held title to the vehicle free and clear, and Eastern Shore held a reissued certificate of title for the same vehicle, listing it as lienholder. Eastern Short attempted to repossess the vehicle; the nephew avoided being arrested by producing the free-and-clear title to the vehicle. According to Tarabein, he became aware of the existence of the second certificate of title after the attempted arrest. Tarabein thereafter sued the dealership for a variety of claims; the dealer moved to compel arbitration. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the dealership failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of a contract calling for arbitration: the sales contract was limited in its scope with respect to disputes arising to parties to the contract and the agreements, here, between the nephew and the dealership. Accordingly, the Court found the trial court did not err in denying the dealership’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Daphne Automotive, LLC v. Eastern Shore Neurology Clinic, Inc." on Justia Law

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The City filed suit against Baseline, alleging contract, negligence and professional malpractice, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The City's claims stemmed from a contract with Baseline, in which Baseline would assist with the permitting, design, and construction of a water treatment plant for the City. The Eighth Circuit held that, to the extent an arbitration provision was like a forum-selection clause, the motion seeking to compel arbitration was not properly construed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3); just as a forum selection clause has no bearing on the issue of whether venue was wrong or improper, an arbitration agreement has no relevance to the question of whether a given case satisfied constitutional or statutory definitions of jurisdiction; contrary to Baseline's contention, the July 2009 Contract's arbitration clause did not strip the federal courts of jurisdiction; and therefore the district court erred in construing the motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the City that Baseline's motion was properly analyzed under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56. Under both rules, the summary judgment standard applied. The court reversed and remanded for summary judgment proceedings in the district court. View "City of Benkelman, NE v. Baseline Engineering Corp." on Justia Law

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Brittania-U filed suit against defendants for fraud, misrepresentation, and tortious interference with business relations arising out of a bidding process for oil leases in Nigeria. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Brittania-U's motion to remand and the grant of defendants' motions to dismiss based on an arbitration provision in a confidentiality agreement between Brittania-U and Chevron. The court held that jurisdiction exists, and removal was proper, under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 203. The court also held that the district court did not err in recognizing that the confidentiality agreement's arbitration provision delegated the question of arbitrability to the arbitrators. View "Brittania-U Nigeria, Ltd. v. Chevron USA, Inc." on Justia Law