Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries
Anoke v. Twitter
Sarah Anoke and other employees initiated arbitration proceedings against their employer, X (comprising Twitter, Inc., X Holdings I, Inc., X Holdings Corp., X Corp., and Elon Musk), for employment-related disputes. The arbitration provider issued an invoice for $27,200, which Anoke’s counsel mistakenly paid. The arbitration provider marked the invoice as paid and closed, then refunded the payment and issued a new invoice to X, which X paid within 30 days.Anoke petitioned the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco to compel X to pay her arbitration-related attorney fees and costs, arguing that X’s payment was untimely because it was not made within 30 days of the first invoice. The superior court denied the petition, reasoning that since the first invoice was nullified after Anoke’s attorney mistakenly paid it and X timely paid the second invoice, X met the statutory deadline.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory deadline for payment was tied to the due date set by the arbitration provider’s invoice. Since the first invoice was paid (albeit mistakenly) and the second invoice was paid within 30 days, there was no default. The court affirmed the superior court’s order, concluding that the arbitrator acted within its authority by issuing a second invoice and that the statute did not require the arbitrator to reinstate the first invoice after it had been paid and closed. The court also noted that the reasons for a timely payment are irrelevant under the statute. View "Anoke v. Twitter" on Justia Law
Samuelian v. Life Generations Healthcare, LLC
The case involves a dispute between Robert and Stephen Samuelian (the Samuelians) and Life Generations Healthcare, LLC (the Company), which they co-founded along with Thomas Olds, Jr. The Samuelians sold a portion of their interest in the Company, and the new operating agreement included a noncompetition provision. The Samuelians later challenged this provision in arbitration, arguing it was unenforceable under California law.The arbitrator found the noncompetition provision invalid per se under California Business and Professions Code section 16600, as it arose from the sale of a business interest. The arbitrator also ruled that the Samuelians did not owe fiduciary duties to the Company because they were members of a manager-managed limited liability company. The Company argued that the arbitrator had legally erred by applying the per se standard instead of the reasonableness standard. The trial court reviewed the arbitrator’s ruling de novo, found no error, and confirmed the award.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the arbitrator had applied the wrong standard under section 16600. The court concluded that noncompetition agreements arising from the partial sale of a business interest should be evaluated under the reasonableness standard, not the per se standard. The court reasoned that a partial sale leaves the seller with some ongoing connection to the business, which could have procompetitive benefits. Therefore, such restraints require further scrutiny to determine their reasonableness.The court reversed the trial court’s judgment confirming the arbitration award and directed the trial court to enter an order denying the Samuelians’ petition to confirm the award and granting the Company’s motion to vacate the entire award, including the portion awarding attorney fees and costs. View "Samuelian v. Life Generations Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law
International Petroleum Products and Additives Co, Inc. v. Black Gold S.A.R.L.
The case involves International Petroleum Products and Additives Company (IPAC), a California-based company, which entered into sales and distribution agreements with Black Gold S.A.R.L., a Monaco-based company. Black Gold breached these agreements by using IPAC’s confidential information to develop competing products. IPAC won an arbitration award of over $1 million against Black Gold. However, Black Gold declared bankruptcy in Monaco, complicating IPAC’s efforts to collect the award.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment against Black Gold. During post-judgment discovery, Black Gold engaged in misconduct, leading the district court to sanction Black Gold and add Lorenzo and Sofia Napoleoni, Black Gold’s owners, as judgment debtors on the grounds that they were Black Gold’s alter egos. Black Gold’s petition for recognition of its Monaco bankruptcy proceedings was initially denied by the bankruptcy court, but this decision was later reversed by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), which mandated recognition of the Monaco proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the automatic bankruptcy stay under 11 U.S.C. § 1520 did not retroactively apply to the date of the bankruptcy court’s initial denial of Black Gold’s petition. The court also held that the automatic stay did not extend to IPAC’s alter ego claim against the Napoleonis. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and the award of attorneys’ fees and costs in favor of IPAC, concluding that the alter ego claim was not the property of Black Gold’s estate under California law. View "International Petroleum Products and Additives Co, Inc. v. Black Gold S.A.R.L." on Justia Law
Steines v. Westgate Palace, L.L.C.
Adam and Miranda Steines, along with Andrew Ormesher, filed a class action lawsuit against Westgate, a resort company, alleging violations of the Military Lending Act (MLA). The Steines, who purchased a timeshare in Orlando and financed it through a loan from Westgate, claimed that Westgate's loan documents did not comply with the MLA's requirements, including the prohibition of mandatory arbitration clauses. The Steines sought rescission of their timeshare, injunctive relief, damages, and restitution.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held an evidentiary hearing and denied Westgate's motions to compel arbitration and dismiss the complaint. The court found that the MLA applied to the timeshare loan and that the MLA's prohibition on mandatory arbitration clauses overrode the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Westgate appealed the decision, arguing that the district court should not have addressed the arbitrability issue and that the MLA did not override the FAA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the question of whether the MLA overrides the FAA is a matter for the court to decide, not the arbitrator. The court found that the MLA explicitly prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer credit contracts involving servicemembers, thereby overriding the FAA. Additionally, the court agreed with the district court's finding that the timeshare loan did not qualify as a "residential mortgage" under the MLA, as the timeshare units were more akin to hotel rooms than residential dwellings.As a result, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, affirming that the MLA's provisions rendered the FAA inapplicable in this case. View "Steines v. Westgate Palace, L.L.C." on Justia Law
Domer v. Menard, Inc.
Pilar Domer placed an online order for a can of paint from Menards, selecting an in-store pickup option that incurred a $1.40 fee. Domer later filed a class action lawsuit against Menards, alleging that the company failed to disclose the pickup fee and used it to manipulate prices. Menards moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in their online terms of order. The district court granted Menards' motion, finding that Domer had agreed to the arbitration terms and that her claims fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin ruled in favor of Menards, determining that the arbitration agreement was enforceable. The court found that Menards provided adequate notice of the terms and that Domer had unambiguously agreed to them by completing her purchase. The court also concluded that Domer’s claims were related to her purchase contract with Menards and thus fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Menards' website provided reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms, and Domer unambiguously manifested her assent by submitting her order. The court also found that Domer’s claims, which included violations of consumer protection laws and unjust enrichment, arose from or related to her purchase contract with Menards. Therefore, the claims were within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable, and Domer’s claims must be arbitrated. View "Domer v. Menard, Inc." on Justia Law
Wade v. Vertical Computer Systems, Inc.
Richard Wade, the former president, CEO, and director of Vertical Computer Systems, Inc., was sued in April 2020 by the company's chief technical officer and several shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. Wade's address was initially listed as "3717 Cole Avenue, Apt. 293, Dallas, Texas 75204." After a year, the claims against Wade were severed into a separate action, and the trial court ordered binding arbitration. Wade's attorney later filed a motion to withdraw, listing Wade's address as "3717 Cole Ave., Apt. 277, Dallas, Texas 75204." Notice of the trial was sent to this incorrect address.The trial court scheduled a bench trial for April 19, 2022, and Wade appeared pro se but did not present any evidence. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them over $21 million. Wade filed a pro se notice of appeal, arguing that he did not receive proper notice of the trial. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and found that Wade did not receive proper notice of the trial setting, which violated his due process rights. The court noted that the notice was sent to an incorrect address and that Wade had informed the trial court of this issue. The court held that proceeding to trial without proper notice was reversible error and that Wade was entitled to a new trial. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wade v. Vertical Computer Systems, Inc." on Justia Law
Coleman v. System One Holdings LLC
Plaintiffs Tommy Coleman and Jason Perkins, who worked as oil and gas pipeline inspectors for System One Holdings, LLC, were paid a flat daily rate without overtime compensation, even when working over forty hours a week. They filed a lawsuit claiming this violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and sought unpaid overtime on behalf of themselves and a putative class of similarly compensated inspectors.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case. System One moved to dismiss and compel arbitration, arguing that the plaintiffs had signed arbitration agreements enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The plaintiffs countered that they fell under the transportation workers' exemption to the FAA. The District Court, following the precedent set in Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., ordered limited discovery into the arbitrability of the claims before deciding on the motion to compel arbitration. System One's motion for reconsideration of this order was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine if it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal from the District Court's order. The Third Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the District Court's order did not formally deny the motion to compel arbitration but rather deferred its decision pending limited discovery. The court emphasized that the FAA permits appeals from specific types of orders, and the order in question did not fall within those categories. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Coleman v. System One Holdings LLC" on Justia Law
JES Farms Partnership v. Indigo Ag Inc.
JES Farms Partnership sold crops through Indigo Ag's digital platform. In 2021, JES initiated arbitration against Indigo, alleging breach of a marketplace seller agreement and trade rule violations. Indigo counterclaimed, alleging JES breached the agreement and its addenda. JES then sought a federal court's declaratory judgment that Indigo’s counterclaims were not arbitrable and that some addenda were invalid. Indigo moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement's arbitration clause.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota partially denied Indigo's motion. The court agreed that Indigo’s counterclaims were arbitrable but ruled that the enforceability of the addenda was not arbitrable under the marketplace seller agreement. The court found the arbitration clause "narrow" and concluded that disputes about the addenda's enforceability did not relate to crop transactions. Indigo appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the arbitration clause in the marketplace seller agreement was broad, covering "any dispute" related to the agreement or transactions under it. The court found that the enforceability of the addenda was indeed a dispute "relating to crop transactions" and thus fell within the scope of the arbitration clause. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and directed it to grant Indigo’s motion to compel arbitration and address the case's status pending arbitration. View "JES Farms Partnership v. Indigo Ag Inc." on Justia Law
Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. School Committee of Boston
The case involves a dispute between the Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (the union), and the School Committee of Boston (the committee). The union alleged that the committee failed to hire eighteen "cluster" paraprofessional substitutes as required by their collective bargaining agreement. An arbitrator sustained the union's grievance in July 2020 and ordered the committee to comply with the hiring requirement. The committee did not seek to vacate or modify the award. Nineteen months later, the union sought judicial confirmation of the arbitration award, which the committee opposed, claiming substantial compliance.In the Superior Court, the union filed a complaint to confirm the arbitration award and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The committee responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Superior Court judge granted the committee's motion to dismiss and denied the union's motion, reasoning that there was no statutory right to confirmation when no dispute was alleged.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that under General Laws c. 150C, § 10, the Superior Court is required to confirm an arbitration award upon application by a party unless a timely motion to vacate or modify the award has been made. The court emphasized that the statute's language is clear and mandatory, stating that the Superior Court "shall" confirm the award if no such motion is pending. The court rejected the committee's argument that confirmation should be discretionary and noted that the purpose of § 10 is to enforce arbitration awards.The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Superior Court's order, granting the committee's motion to dismiss and denying the union's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court ordered that the arbitration award be confirmed. View "Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. School Committee of Boston" on Justia Law
Ronderos v. USF Reddaway, Inc.
The plaintiff, Jose Emilio Ronderos, applied for a job with USF Reddaway, Inc. and Yellow Corporation (collectively, "Reddaway") and was required to sign an arbitration agreement as part of the application process. Ronderos later filed employment-related claims against Reddaway, alleging age and disability discrimination, retaliation, and other violations under California law. Ronderos claimed that the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Reddaway's motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, involved significant oppression, and contained a substantively opaque cost-splitting provision. The court also found that the agreement was substantively unconscionable due to its one-sided filing provision and preliminary injunction carve-out, which unfairly favored Reddaway. The district court declined to sever the unconscionable provisions and enforce the remainder of the agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. It held that the agreement involved significant oppression and some surprise, making it procedurally unconscionable. The court also found that the one-sided filing provision and preliminary injunction carve-out were substantively unconscionable. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to sever the unconscionable provisions and affirmed the denial of Reddaway's motion to compel arbitration. View "Ronderos v. USF Reddaway, Inc." on Justia Law