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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Lender’s application to compel arbitration and stay proceedings on the claims brought by Borrower, holding that the plain language of the parties’ arbitration agreement showed they agreed to arbitrate before a specified, but unavailable, arbitrator and no other arbitrator. The contracts between the parties contained an arbitration agreement stating that any dispute between the parties shall be resolved by binding arbitration by the National Arbitration Forum (NAF). Thereafter, NAF entered into a consent decree requiring it immediately to stop providing arbitration services for consumer claims nationwide. After Borrower defaulted, Lender filed suit. Borrower counterclaimed. Lender moved to compel arbitration on Borrower’s counterclaim and asked the circuit court to designate a new arbitrator where NAF was unavailable as an arbitrator. The circuit court denied Lender's application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Lender made the choice to insist upon NAF, and only NAF, as the arbitration forum, Lender could not now expand the arbitration promise it extracted from Borrower in the agreement. View "A-1 Premium Acceptance, Inc. v. Hunter" on Justia Law

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The employer sought review by the federal district court and obtained a judicial order vacating an award on the ground that the arbitrator improperly applied external law to contradict the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and upheld the arbitrator's award, holding that the text of the CBA permitted the arbitrator to look to external law in interpreting the agreement. The court held that the language contained in the preamble of the CBA suspended any part of the CBA that either the company or union believed to conflict with state law. In this case, while the court would have preferred that the arbitrator cite to that language before applying the Concealed Carry Act to reinstate the employee, the extraordinarily deferential standard of review compelled the court to uphold the award. View "Ameren Illinois Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers" on Justia Law

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At issue was whether the time to file a motion to vacate an arbitration award is limited by the opposing party’s filing of a motion to confirm and how an order denying a motion to vacate an arbitration award can properly be appealed. After receiving notice of an arbitrator’s award in their favor, Plaintiffs filed a motion to confirm the award. Before the ninety-day period in which Defendants could file a motion to vacate the award had expired, the circuit court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to confirm. Defendants, then moved to vacate the award within the ninety-day period. The circuit court denied the motion to vacate. Defendants appealed the judgment of confirmation and the order denying the motion to vacate. The ICA dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, the circuit court amended its order to “again confirm” the award to allow Defendants to appeal. The ICA dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that because Defendants timely appealed an order that amended the circuit court’s prior order denying their motion to vacate in a “material and substantial respect” and because Defendants filed their motion to vacate within the statutory period, the ICA erred in dismissing the appeal. View "Bennett v. Chung" on Justia Law

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Rhonda Stephan as the personal representative of the Estate of Bobby Gene Hicks, appealed an order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Millennium Nursing and Rehab Center, Inc. Stephan contends that Hicks, her father, died in 2015 while he was a resident at Millennium Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, a skilled-nursing facility owned and operated by Millennium ("the Rehab Center"). During Hicks's hospitalization at Crestwood Medical Center ("Crestwood"), Stephan signed all the paperwork arranging for her father to be discharged from the hospital and transferred to the Rehab Center; however, she did not hold a power of attorney or other actual legal authority to act on Hicks's behalf or to contract in his name. Hicks did not sign any of the paperwork, but he is named as a party to the contracts included within that paperwork. On October 26, 2015, Hicks was transferred from Crestwood to the Rehab Center. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Stephan could not be bound to the arbitration provision in her capacity as personal representative to Hicks' estate when she signed the agreement at issue here in her capacity, in what amounted to, Hicks' relative or next friend. View "Stephan v. Millennium Nursing and Rehab Center, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this appeal of a judgment confirming an arbitration award, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err in refusing to vacate the arbitration award under Va. Code 8.01-581.010. Plaintiff filed a fourteen-count complaint against Defendants alleging liability theories for conspiracy, conversion, legal malpractice, breach of trust, and other causes of action. Defendants moved to have the dispute submitted to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision in an agreement between the parties. The circuit court granted the motion to compel arbitration, and the arbitrators found in favor of Defendants on all counts. The circuit court confirmed the award in its entirety and denied Plaintiff’s application to vacate the award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis in law or fact for reversing the circuit court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. View "Meuse v. Henry" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge confirming an arbitration award, holding that the award did not violate public policy under the circumstances of this case. Employee, a police officer, was terminated from his position as a police officer in the Pittsfield police department for making false statements. Thereafter, Employee’s union (Union) filed a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the City of Pittsfield. An arbitrator found that there was not just cause for termination and reinstated Employee. The City commenced an action pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150C, 11 to vacate the arbitrator’s award, arguing that it was contrary to public policy. A superior court judge confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where the arbitrator found that Employee’s statements were not intentionally false and did not lead to a wrongful arrest of prosecution or result in any deprivation of liberty or denial of civil rights, the arbitrator’s award of reinstatement did not violate public policy. View "City of Pittsfield v. Local 447 International Brotherhood of Police Officers" on Justia Law

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Levandowski and Ron started working at Google in 2007. Both resigned from Google in 2016. After leaving, they formed Otto, a self-driving technology company which Google considered a competitor of its own self-driving car project. In August 2016, Otto was acquired by Uber. In October 2016, Google initiated arbitration proceedings against Levandowski and Ron for allegedly breaching non-solicitation and non-competition agreements. The arbitration was scheduled to commence in April 2018. Google sought discovery from Uber, a nonparty to the arbitration, related to pre-acquisition due diligence done by Stroz at the request of Uber and Otto’s outside counsel. Over Uber’s objections, the arbitration panel determined the due diligence documents were not protected by either the attorney client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine and ordered them produced. Uber initiated a special proceeding in superior court seeking to vacate the discovery order and prevailed. The court of appeal reversed the superior court’s order. The due diligence-related documents prepared by Stroz were not protected attorney-client communications nor were they entitled to absolute protection from disclosure under the attorney work product doctrine. Although the materials had qualified protection as work product, denial of the materials would unfairly prejudice Google’s preparation of its claims. View "Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a class action filed by plaintiff, alleging claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The court held that the district court's dismissal without prejudice supported appellate jurisdiction. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the case for want of prosecution in response to plaintiff's disobedience to its prior order compelling arbitration. View "Griggs v. S.G.E. Management" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court’s order denying Employer’s motion to compel enforcement of the arbitration agreement between the parties in this case, holding that the arbitration agreement between Employer and Employee was unenforceable as a matter of law. Employer conditioned Employee’s continued employment on her agreement to arbitrate any dispute that may arise between them. The Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable as a matter of state statutory law because (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 336.700(2) prohibits employers from conditioning employment on an existing employee’s or prospective employee’s agreement to “waive, arbitrate, or otherwise diminish any existing or future claim, right, or benefit to which the employee or person seeking employment would otherwise be entitled”; and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act does not mandate a contrary holding because it does not preempt section 336.700(2) in this case. View "Northern Kentucky Area Development District v. Snyder" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.09 motion filed by Respondent to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration agreement between the parties was enforceable. The circuit court in this case issued an order invalidating the arbitration clause contained in the parties’ employment contract. Thereafter, Respondent a motion seeking interlocutory relief to compel arbitration. The court of appeals determined that even where the contract expressly allows Respondent to seek provisional injunctive remedies in a court pending arbitration but did not specifically provide the same right to Movant, the lack of reciprocal access to the courts for injunctive relief did not invalidate the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration agreement did not lack mutuality, was supported by adequate consideration, and was not unconscionable. View "Grimes v. GHSW Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law