by
Petitioners the New England Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NEPBA) and the State Employees’ Association of New Hampshire, Inc., SEIU, Local 1984 (SEA), appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) dismissing their unfair labor practice complaints filed against respondent State of New Hampshire. After several bargaining sessions, the State rejected all wage proposals, explaining that “the Governor was not offering any wage increases . . . given anticipated increases in prescription drug costs in the healthcare market.” As a result, the Teamsters and the NHTA declared an impasse. Although no other unions declared an impasse, the State took the position that all five unions must proceed to impasse mediation. The SEA challenged the State on this position, and subsequently, petitioners each filed complaints with the PELRB. During the pendency of these complaints, the State advised all five unions that it would select a mediator and continued to assert that all of the unions must participate in impasse mediation “because the issues to be resolved affected all bargaining units.” The PELRB consolidated the petitioners’ complaints and found in a 2-1 vote that RSA 273-A:9, I, “requires all five unions to utilize the Union Committee format at the bargaining table and during impasse resolution proceedings until such time as the common terms and condition[s] of employment are settled.” The PELRB, therefore, dismissed the complaints and ordered the petitioners to coordinate with the other unions “to determine the forum in which negotiations will go forward.” Petitioners unsuccessfully moved for rehearing, and this appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's dismissal of petitioners' complaints, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the PELRB. View "Appeal of New England Police Benevolent Association, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Ramos, an experienced litigator and patent practitioner with a doctorate in biophysics, was hired as a Winston law firm “Income Partner.” After allegedly being denied recognition for her work, excluded from opportunities for career advancement, evaluated based on the success of her male colleagues, and denied compensation and bonuses to which she was entitled, Ramos sued, asserting discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination, and anti-fair-pay practices. Winston moved to compel arbitration under the partnership agreement Ramos signed after joining the firm. Ramos argued she was an “employee,” not a partner, so that precedent (Armendariz) applied and that the arbitration provision failed to meet Armendariz's minimum requirements arbitration of unwaivable statutory claims. The trial court found that Ramos was “in a partnership relationship” for purposes of the motion, severed provisions related to venue and cost-sharing, and granted Winston’s motion. The court of appeal reversed. Under the Armendariz analysis, the agreement is unconscionable and the taint of illegality cannot be removed by severing the unlawful provisions without altering the nature of the parties’ agreement. Provisions requiring Ramos to pay half the costs of arbitration, pay her own attorney fees, restricting the ability of the arbitrators to “override” or “substitute its judgment” for that of the partnership, and the confidentiality clause, are unconscionable and significantly inhibit Ramos’s ability to pursue her unwaivable statutory claims. View "Ramos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

by
Where a roofing shingle manufacturer displays on the exterior wrapping of every package of shingles the entirety of its product-purchase agreement—including, as particularly relevant here, a mandatory-arbitration provision— homeowners whose roofers ordered, opened, and installed the shingles are bound by the agreement's terms. The Eleventh Circuit held that the manufacturer's packaging in this case sufficed to convey a valid offer of contract terms, that unwrapping and retaining the shingles was an objectively reasonable means of accepting that offer, and that the homeowners' grant of express authority to their roofers to buy and install shingles necessarily included the act of accepting purchase terms on the homeowners' behalf. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant the manufacturer's motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the homeowners' complaint. View "Dye v. Tamko Building Products, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Au pairs and former au pairs filed a class action lawsuit against AuPairCare, Inc. (“APC”) and other au pair sponsoring companies alleging violations of antitrust laws, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), federal and state minimum wage laws, and other state laws. Eventually, the au pairs amended their complaint and added two former au pairs, Juliane Harning and Laura Mejia Jimenez, who were sponsored by APC. In response, APC filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the district court denied. The district court found the arbitration provision between the parties both procedurally and substantively unconscionable and declined to enforce it. Because the arbitration provision contained only one substantively unconscionable clause, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court abused its discretion by refusing to sever the offending clause and otherwise enforce the agreement to arbitrate. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded for further proceedings. View "Beltran v. Interexchange, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment refusing to enforce an arbitral award against the Czech Republic Ministry of Health and in favor of Diag Human, S.E., a corporation organized under the laws of the Principality of Liechtenstein. The court held that the final award was not binding on the Czech Republic where, not only the termination of the review, but also the content of the arbitration review panel's "Resolution," prevented the final award from becoming binding. Pursuant to the agreement, the parties had recourse to another arbitration panel, which was sufficient to prevent the award from becoming binding at that time. View "Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Republic - Ministry of Health" on Justia Law

by
Singing River Health System a/k/a Singing River Hospital System (“Singing River”) sued KPMG, LLP, alleging separate counts of breach of contract and negligence and/or professional malpractice based on the audits KPMG performed for Singing River in fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Singing River alleged that KPMG failed to comply with the professional auditing and accounting standards expressed in GAAS (Generally Accepted Auditing Standards), GAGAS (Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards), and GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), which KPMG had agreed to follow. Singing River specifically alleged that KPMG’s audits were replete with computational errors and incorrect assumptions, and that KPMG had not performed basic tests to substantiate its opinions. Singing River separately alleged that KPMG was negligent and committed professional malpractice by failing to use the skill, prudence, and diligence other reasonable and prudent auditors would use in similar circumstances, as expressed in the GAAS, GAGAS and GAAP. Singing River alleged, inter alia, that, as a direct and proximate result of KPMG’s audits, Singing River was unaware that its employee-pension plan was underfunded by approximately one-hundred-fifty million dollars ($150,000,000.00). Further, Singing River alleged that it was unaware that it was not in compliance with certain bond covenants due to KPMG’s negligence. KPMG sought to compel arbitration of Singing River’s claims. The circuit court declined to order Singing River to arbitration. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined KPMG’s 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 letters were not spread across the Board’s minutes. The Court could not enforce these contracts or the dispute-resolution clauses attached to them. KPMG’s additional arguments concerning the delegation clause, collateral estoppel, and direct-benefit estoppel were without merit. The trial court’s order denying KPMG’s motion to compel arbitration was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "KPMG, LLP v. Singing River Health System" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff Jeff Gist worked as a driver for defendant Driver Resources, LLC. The other two defendants were related companies. In November 2013, plaintiff filed a class-action complaint against defendants, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated drivers. At issue was defendants’ compliance with Oregon’s wage and hour laws. In January 2014, defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration, on the basis of an agreement that plaintiff had signed with one defendant. Plaintiff responded to the petition by arguing that the agreement was unconscionable, and therefore that arbitration should not be compelled. The trial court granted defendants’ petition, requiring plaintiff to proceed to arbitration. Plaintiff made several attempts to obtain appellate review of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. This case required the Oregon Supreme Court to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed plaintiff’s appeal of a judgment dismissing his complaint with prejudice on the grounds that the appeal was barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Steenson v. Robinson, 385 P2d 738 (1963). That decision set out the common-law rule that a party may not appeal from a voluntarily-requested judgment. The Court concluded the judgment was appealable and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. View "Gist v. Zoan Management, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration of claims brought by Appellee, holding that the district court did not err in denying Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration. At issue in this case was a dealership agreement containing an arbitration clause. The agreement was signed by Frontline Ag, LLC and John Deere Company. Appellee owned an interest in Frontline. The dealer agreement contained an arbitration clause requiring arbitration of disputes between Deere and Frontline, the dealer. Appellee eventually filed this action against Deere alleging, inter alia, tortious interference with contract. Deere moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that Appellee never agreed to arbitrate his claims against Deere and that the dealer agreement only required arbitration of disputes between Deere and Frontline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration clause did not incorporate Appellee’s personal damage claims within its definition of disputes subject to mandatory arbitration. View "Anderson v. John Deere & Co." on Justia Law

by
After plaintiff filed class and collective actions against her former employer for wage and hour violations, the district court compelled arbitration pursuant to an agreement between the parties. The district court also struck as unlawful a waiver clause that appeared to forbid class or collective arbitration of plaintiff's claims. The arbitrator awarded more than $10 million in damages and fees to plaintiff and 174 similarly situated employees. The Seventh Circuit held that the availability of class or collective arbitration is a threshold question of arbitrability. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court, rather than the arbitrator, to evaluate plaintiff's contract with her employer to determine whether it permitted class or collective arbitration. View "Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit against GC Services, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of GC Services' motion to compel arbitration and held that the company waived any right to arbitrate. In this case, GC Services did not discover the existence of the arbitration agreement for eight months, and then the company did not notify the court or move to compel arbitration for another five months. Furthermore, none of the explanations offered for the delays were adequate, and GC Services' decision to litigate the merits of plaintiff's legal theory and request for class certification was inconsistent with a desire to arbitrate. View "Smith v. GC Services LP" on Justia Law